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4 Introduction: Towards European unification 
Even before the founding of the European Community the idea of a closely knit associa-
tion of European States had found political expression in a variety of ways. There had 
been attempts to impose unity by force, notably by Napoleon and Hitler - Napoleon 
seeking to unite the Continent under French hegemony,  Hitler to subjugate Europe 
under the dictatorship of the Third Reich. But there had also been peaceful schemes, 
especially after the harrowing experience of the First World War, for a voluntary grouping 
of States on terms of equality. 
In  1923,  for  instance,  the  Austrian  leader of the  Pan-European  Movement,  Count 
Coudenhove Kalergi, had called for the creation of a United States of Europe, citing ex-
amples such as the success of the Swiss struggle for unity in 1648, the forging of the Ger· 
man Empire in 1871 and, first and foremost, the recognition of the independence of the 
United States of America in 1776. Then on 29 September 1929, in a now famous speech 
before the League of Nations Assembly in Geneva, the French Foreign Minister, Aristide 
Briand, with the backing of his German counterpart, Gustav Stresemann, proposed the 
creation of a European Union within the framework of the League of Nations. The im· 
mediate aim was merely to promote closer cooperation between the States of Europe, 
leaving their national sovereignty intact. 
But all these efforts for peaceful unification failed to make any real headway against the 
still dominant tide of nationalism and imperialism. Only after Europe bad yet again been 
devastated  by  war  was  the  disastrous  futility  of constant  national  rivalry  truly  ap-
preciated. Europe's complete collapse and the political and economic exhaustion of the 
European States with their outdated national structures set the stage for a completely 
fresh start and called for a far more radical approach to the reordering of Europe. 
The subsequent moves towards integration sprang from  three main factors.  First was 
Europe's realization of her own weakness. As a result of her internal dissensions and wars 
she had lost her age~ld position at the centre of the world stqe. Her place was taken 
by the two new superpowers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. each 
of which now wielded far greater military, political, and economic might than a divided, 
patchwork Europe of individual States could muster. Second was the conviction, summed 
up in the motto 'Never again!', that renewed military conflict must be avoided. Emerging 
from the terrible experience of two world wars - both of which had begun as European 
'civil wars' and in which Europe had been the main battlefteld and principal sufferer -
5 this took shape as the guiding principle of all political action. Third was the earnest desire 
for a better, freer, juster world in which social and international relations would be con-
ducted in a more orderly way. 
Thken together the post-war moves towards European unification offer a picture so con-
fusing as to baffle anyone but the most knowledgeable expert on European affairs. A 
multitude of different organizations, all formally quite unconnected with each other, 
have come into existence side by side: the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the Western European Union (WEU), the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (N  A10), the Council of Europe, and the European Communities (compris-
ing the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community 
and the European Economic Community). Their membership ranges from seven in the 
WEU to 23 in the Council of Europe. looking at their underlying concrete aims, however, 
a clear pattern begins to emerge, revealing three major groups. 
The first group consists of the 'transatlantic' organizations which grew out of the close 
links forged between Western Europe and the USA after the war. Not surprisingly, it was 
an American initiative that led to the founding in 1948 of the first post-war European 
'Our Europe!' SchookhlldrM looking at a map of  the European Community. 
6 orpnization, the OEEC (Orpnization for European Economic Cooperation), after the 
then US Secretary of State, George Marshall, had called on the countries of Europe to 
pool their efforts for economic reconstruction, promising them American aid (which 
eventually took shape in the Marshall Plan). In 1960 the members of  the OEEC, together 
with the USA and Canada, agreed to extend the orpnization's activities to include 
development aid for the Third World and, with those two countries becominJ members 
that same year, the OEEC was renamed the OECD (Organization for Economic Coopera· 
tion and Development). 
The founding of the OEEC was followed in 1949 by NATO - a military pact between 
the USA, Canada and the majority of the free States in Europe. Then in 1954 the Western 
European Union was founded. Intended to strengthen security cooperation between the 
countries of Europe, it extended the existing Brussels 'Ii'eaty between Britain, France, 
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to include the Federal Republic of Germany 
and Italy. Recently A:>rtugal also applied for membership. 
The WEU offers its members a platform for closer cooperation on security and defence, 
helping them to forge a European identity in this fteld and so lend greater weiaht to the 
European voice in the Atlantic alliance. The characteristic feature of the second group 
of European organizations is that their structure is designed to allow as many countries 
as possible to participate. Consequently it had to be accepted that their activities would 
not extend beyond the scope of normal international cooperation. Their prime concern 
is to accommodate countries which are unable or unwilling to become members of an 
organization  endowed  with  supranational  powers,  either  because  their  traditional 
neutrality-as in the case of Sweden, Austria, or Switzerland-or because of  their reluc-
tance to cede any part of their sovereignty. 
This group comes under the umbrella of the Council of Europe, which was founded on 
5 May 1949 as political organization. The Statute of the Council of Europe contains no 
reference to any such goals as federation or union, nor does it provide for any transfer 
or pooling of areas of national sovereignty. Decision-making power resides solely with a 
Committee  of Ministers  and  unanimity  is  required  for  all  decisions  on  matters of 
substance. This means that any country can use its veto to block a decision, as in the 
United Nations Security Council. There is also a Parliamentary Assembly, but it is a pure-
ly consultative body with no legislative powers. It can do no more than make recommen-
dations to the Committee of Ministers; and as the Committee is not answerable to the 
Assembly, a recommendation can be rejected by a single dissenting vote. Even after a pro-
posal has been adopted by the Committee of Ministers it has to be ratified by the national 
parliaments before it can have legal effect. By its very structure, then, the Council of 
Europe is merely an instrument of inter-governmental cooperation. 
Nevertheless, its contribution to the cause of European unity, in particular in fostering 
European solidarity, cannot be rated highly enough. Its aim is to create closer links among 
the countries of Europe and to promote their economic and social progress. In this it has 
7 The Jathers' of  Europe, at the slgnoture of  the first European Community 7reoty, setting up the European 
Cool and Steel Community,  In Auls on 18 Aprli195J. They are, left to right: Azul von Zalmul (11elglum), 
JOfieph Bech (lwcembourg). Joseph M.urlce (11elgium), Count Carlo Sforza (/IDly). Robert Schuman (France), 
Konmd Adenouer (Germany). Dirk Stikker (Netherlands) and Johannes van den Brink (Netherlands). 
succeeded.  Its membership  has  grown from  the  10 original founders  to  23  (Britain, 
France,  Belgium,  Netherlands,  Luxembourg,  Italy,  Ireland,  Denmark,  Norway,  and 
Sweden being subsequently joined by Iceland, Greece, Thrkey, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Austria, Cyprus, Switzerland, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Liechtenstein, Finland 
and San Marino). Under its auspices numerous economic, cultural, social and legal con-
ventions have been adopted by the member States. The most significant and most widely 
known of these is the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, adopted on 4 November 1950. This not only laid down a prac-
tical minimum standard of human rights to be applied in the member States but also 
established a system for legal remedy, empowering the institutions set up under the Con-
vention - the European Commission for Human Rights and the European Court of 
Human Rights - to condemn infringements of human rights by the signatories. 
8 The thlfrl  group of  European organizations comprises the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity, the European Atomic EDeiiY Community and the European Economic Com-
munity. From the lepl  point of view, the three Communities exist aepuately aide by side. 
From the point of view of political reality, however, they can be treated as a sinale entity. 
Their creation can be regarded as marking the birth of 'the European Community~ 
The major innovatiw feature of the European Community complied with other interna-
tional bodies is that its members haw ceded to it a part of their national sovoemanty, with 
the goal of forming a cohesiw, indissoluble organizational and political unit. They haw: 
enc:Jowm it with sovereign powers of its own, independent of the Member States, which 
it can exercise to adopt acts which haw: the force of national law. This DOYel approach 
of poolin& national sovereignty and policies is commonly referred to as 'integration'. The 
European Community, then, offers the most advanced example of European intepation. 
This booklet will look at its origins and growth in some detail. 
9 I. The origins of the European Community 
The foundation stone in the building of the European Community was laid on 9 May 
1950, when Robert Schuman, the French Foreian Minister, put forward a plan worked 
out by  himself and Jean Monnet for France and Germany to pool al  their co.tand steel 
production under a joint High Authority within an organization open to any other coun-
try in Europe that wished to join. 
Behind this proposal lay a twofold realization: on the one hand it wu  pointless to impose 
unilateral restrictions on Germany; but at the same time a fully independent Germany 
was still percei"Yed as a potential threat to peace. The only way out of this dilemma was 
to bind Germany politically and economically into a fumly baled poupina of European 
States. The plan thus took up the idea put forward by Wmston Churchill in his famous 
Zurich speech of 19 September 1946, in which he had called for the creation of  a United 
States of Europe, sinJling out Franco-German cooperation as the essential prerequisite. 
Churchill, ~.  had envisaged Britain's role as a promoter rather than as an acti~ 
participant. 
On 18 April1951 six countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands) sianed a 'Ii'eaty establishin& the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) and with the 'Ii'eaty's entry into force on 23 July 1952 the Schuman Plan became 
practical reality. The new Community's foundin& fathers hoped that it would be the seed 
from which the further political intearation of Europe would pow, culminating in the 
emerpnce of a European Constitution. 
In October 1950, before the ECSC 'Deaty had been signed, the French launched the idea 
of a European Defence Community (EDC). The outbreak of the Korean war and moun· 
ting East-West tension showed the need for a greater defence effort by the Western Euro-
pean countries, and this meant that West Germany had to be included. But the wounds 
of the Second Vtbrld War had hardly begun to heal and the idea of a German national 
army, especially in French eyes, was quite unacceptable. Known u the Pl6wn Plan, the 
answer once apin was to bind Germany into a supranational Community (this time 
coverina defence as well) which would ensure adequate control of a re-armed Germany. 
In Ausust 1954, hoMwr, the plan was dashed when the French National Assembly, un· 
willing to countenance such a far-reachin& curb on French IKMI'eignty as to relinquish 
the riaht to maintain a national army, refused to ratify the 'Il'eaty. 
II The failure of the European Defence Community also dealt a severe blow to efforts aimed 
at the political unification of Europe. For a while optimism gave way to resignation. But 
then, in June 1955, the Foreign Ministers of the ECSC countries launched a new in-
itiative for the 'creation of a United  Europe~ The governments of the Six had come to 
realize that it was in their interest to progress further alons the path on which they had 
embarked with the founding of the ECSC. 
For the Federal Republic of Germany involvement in the integration process signified its 
political rehabilitation within the community of nations. As a major exporter, Germany 
was - and still is - economically dependent on the European market. The creation of 
the European Economic Community made this market more secure, substantially reduc-
ins the daqers of its reliance on foreign trade. The f~gures for German trade with the 
other Member States give eloquent testimony to the resultins economic benefits. The 
proportion of German exports going to other Community countries rose from 27% at 
the outset to 48% today. 
12 For France the foundina of an economic community that iDcluded Germany wu the 
political expression of ita teadinea for leCODCiliation and of its delire for lutiDa peace 
in Europe. Moreover, membenhip of  the Community offered a wek:ome opportuDity to 
stimulate much-needed industrial expanaion. At::.cess to a laqe Bumpean tradina area 
a1ao opened up vital new markets for its qricultural industry. 
Belaium,  like Germany,  re1iel  heavily on foreian  trade and bence on secure export 
markets, and so the idea of a oommon market was wry attractiw from the ecooomic 
point of  view. The country's interest in theestabliabment of  cloloeoooomic tiel in Europe 
was reinforced by the fad that in the 1950s its indumy was still centred almolt totally 
on ooal and steel. A European internal market was potentially \'m"Y &ipificant, partly 
because of the immediate prospect of boosting its sales of ooal and steel products, but 
above all with a view to establishing and ~loping  new industriea. 
Italy bad already bcaun a drive to industrialize and saw the planned European intcmal 
market  primarily as a unique opportunity for  arowth.  It also counted on fmancial 
SignQnue of  tlw two 71wltln of  Rolrw. sming up tlw Eu/oi»tUU EconomJc Comlfamity IIIJd tlw Bulop«m 
Atomic EMtgy Community (EUI'Qtom),  In Rorrw on 25 March 1957. l'ltcJQ Mows (front mw. ll,{t tD rlfht): 
P.H. S(XIIllcandJ.Cit. Snoyd'Oppum(IWgium). C PlneautuldM. Ftllft(FTrlnc6). K  Admtnlertuld W. Htdll· 
lilln (Gmniury). A. &gnJ and C Martino atlllyJ. J. &ell  and L. Schtlw {Luxtmtboulr). J.l.IIIU tuJd J. Llnthorrt 
Homt111 (N«herraNN.t). 
13 assistance from Community regional aid schemes to develop the more backward parts 
of the country and so reduce the high level of unemployment there. 
The Netherlands also had sreat expectations. Involvement in the integration process 
would give a boost to its industrialization effort and - given its position as the major 
European freight carrier, with large ports and a tailor-made infrastructure - opened up 
bright new prospects for the future. Last but not least, the Dutch, too, were faced with 
the need to secure and expand their markets for agricultural produce. The government's 
European policy found widespread public support, not so much because of the economic 
advantages which beckoned as because of the prospect of security and peace in Europe 
and free and unrestriced travel to neighbouring countries. 
Owing to its geographical situation, Luxembourg had, throughout history, been at the 
mercy of the rivalries between its great neighbours. European integration appeared to of-
fer a way to protect its political, economic and social interests. 
Given these coinciding interests, the logical place to resume the task of European unifica-
tion was at the point where the ECSC bad left off, in other words with the less emotional-
ly charged question of economic integration. The EDC plan had obviously been over-
ambitious. Now the aim was more modest, but more realistic. The Foreian Ministers of 
the six founder members of the ECSC, meeting at the Messina Conference, asked a com-
mittee under the chairmanship of the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, to 
look into the prospects for further integration. In 1956 the Spaak Committee presented 
its report. This formed the basis for negotiations on the lieaties establishing the Euro-
pean Atomic Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC), 
which were signed by the Six in March 1957 and entered into force on 1 January 1958. 
The lieaties had not yet taken effect, however, when the British Government provoked 
a fierce quarrel within Europe over the best approach to European economic integration. 
The British idea was to set up a European free trade area which would involve no sacrifice 
of national sovereignty.  Th.riffs between the members would be dismantled, but each 
country  would  retain  its freedom  of action  in  respect  of trade  with  non-members. 
Although Britain was able to win over Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Austria, Portugal, and 
Switzerland, the initiative eventually failed in the face of the continued determination 
of the Six to press ahead with their scheme for the European Economic Community (now 
underpinned by a treaty). Subsequent British efforts to create a large European free trade 
area embracing the European Economic Community and the other OEEC countries 
finally broke down in late 1958 because of irreconcilable differences between France and 
Britain. Their response was to found the European Free 'Dade Association (EFTA) in 
1959, comprising Britain, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Portugal, Iceland and 
Switzerland, together with Finland as an associate member. 
Impressed by the initial successes of the EEC, the British Government very soon began 
to reconsider its refusal to play an active part in the process of European integration. It 
14 realized that Britain could not be sure of making its political influence felt simply by vir-
tue of its pre-eminent position in the Commonwealth. EFTA was an equally unsuitable 
medium through which to work since its objectives were purely economic-unlike those 
of the Community, which were also political. It was rightly felt that Britain risked political 
isolation by remaining outside the Community. Because of the chaniinl pattern of world 
trade it found itself, like all the major trading nations, under considerable pressure to pro-
tect its existing export markets and to open up new ones. The rapidly arowin& Communi-
ty market offered an ideal opportunity, presenting British fmns with a chance to mobilize 
their reserves of strength in the ften:ely  competiti~ European arena and so help to 
revitalize the economy as a whole. In August 1961 Britain made its fU'It formal applica-
tion for full membership of the Community. Three other countries-Denmark and Nor-
way from EFTA, together with Ireland - followed suit. 
The attraction of Community membership for the Scandinavian countries deri~  from 
their long-held view that they stood to gain more from free trade than they might lose. 
Gi~n  this basic attitude, the strongest factor behind Denmark's application was the pros-
pect of free access to the common market. Danish food production was suffiCient to feed 
15 million people- three times the country's population; it was therefore a matter of 
vital interest to be able to export this substantial surplus freely to a common internal 
market at guaranteed prices. The argument for membership was reinforced by Britain's 
application, since Britain was Denmark's largest export market. Another major factor 
was the longer-term prospect of new openings for Danish industrial Joods. The country's 
years as a member of EFTA had shown that its industry would be able to exploit the op-
portunities. All these factors outweighed the doubts and fears about the consequences 
of intearation and the loosening of national control over important aspects of economic 
policy. 
Ireland had a tradition of close and wide-ranging cultural, reJi&ious and military ties with 
the Continent and the Irish attitude was therefore ~open  to participation in the pro-
cess of European integration. It, too, saw entry into the Community as a chance to boost 
its vital farm exports. E~r  since independence in 1922, Irish qricultural trade had re-
mained Iarzely seared towards the British market, but this was not 1arJe enough to allow 
Irish aariculture to exploit its full productive potential. The importance of qriculture for 
the Irish economy is demonstrated by the fact that it employs one in every fi~  workers 
and accounts for a third of all exports, while the associated food industry provides almost 
a quarter of  all industrial jobs. The industrialization process begun in the mid-1930s had 
led to strong industrial growth, and this also called for new markets. At the same time, 
improved competitiveness gave Irish industry good cause to expect a healthy increase in 
trade and wealth as a result of joining the common market. Yet another sianif'tcant factor 
from the Irish point of view was the Community's Social and  Regional Funds, which both 
promised further economic benefits. 
IS However, in 1963 the accession of the applicant countries was blocked when General de 
Gaulle abruptly broke off the negotiations because of his deep mistrust of the intentions 
behind Britain's application for membership. 
In 1967 Britain applied for the second time-again followed by Ireland, Denmark and 
Norway-and once again the attempt foundered against French reservations. Only after 
de Gaulle stepped down in Apri11969 did the fmal breakthrough come at the Hague Sum-
mit later that year. Followina lengthy negotiations the 'Iieaties of Accession were even-
tually signed on 22 January 1972, and on 1 January 1973 - after successful referenda 
in Ireland and Denmark and ratiration by the national parliaments - Britain, Ireland, 
and Denmark became members of the Communities. A referendum was also held in Nor-
way, but there the idea of membership failed to gain acceptance and the result was a 
53.49% vote against accession. 
During the course of the accession negotiations the question had, of course, arisen as 
to  what should  happen  with  the  remaining  EFTA  countries  (Sweden, Switzerland, 
Austria, Portugal, Finland, Iceland, and-following its decision against membership-
Norway), some of whom could not join the Community because of their neutral status 
while others could not be accepted as members because of their non-democratic regimes. 
The solution eventually adopted was for them to conclude free trade agreements with 
the Community, and these were signed in July 1972. 
With their return to democracy, Greece (1975) followed by Portugal and Spain (1977) ap-
plied for membership of the Community. Greece saw this as a means of stabilizing its new-
ly restored democracy and enhancing its standing and influence on the international 
stage. In economic terms the hope was that, through modernization of agriculture and 
industry, membership would help to put the economy back on its feet. Widely held reser-
vations about the  resulting limitation of national sovereignty and fears of increased 
foreign intervention in Greek domestic affairs were not allowed to overshadow these 
economic interests, and on 1  January 1981 Greece became the lOth member of the Com-
munity. 
The accession of Spain and Portugal also raised numerous difficulties, but these were 
eventually settled in negotiations and, after the signing of the accession treaties in June 
1985 and their ratifiCation by the Parliaments of the Member States and the applicant 
countries, Spain and Portugal duly became the 11th and 12th members of the Communi-
ty on 1 January 1986. 
For Spain this is the fulfilment of an old ambition, even though since Franco's death its 
isolation from Europe has already largely come to an end. From the economic point of 
view the main impact of accession, thanks to the funds this will make available, will be 
to give an appreciable boost to an already highly competitive agricultural industry with 
considerable reserves of productive capacity. Spain's share in Community regional pro-
grammes will, it is hoped, help it to bridge the differences in living standards between the 
16 Brltl.rh Prime M~r  Edwturl H«lth Jigns tM 'Iiwlty of  Acct!sflon, In Bru.r.w/s on 22 lanUIII')I 1972./rwltmd. 
/Anmark and Norway also slgn«Jfor what was to be thejlrst en~  of  the European Community. on 
1  lanUIII')I 1973. NOI'WQy,  h~r.  did not lfltifY tM treaty. so tM  Six only becJinw the HIM In 1973, and not 
the 'Jim. 
various regions. In the industrial sector it will, with the assistance of its new partners, 
be in a better position to initiate the painful but necessary prooe&S of structural adjust· 
ment and so close the long-standing gap between itself and the other countries of  Europe. 
For Portugal, after the loss of its colonies and recovery from domestic political upheaval, 
membership of the Community means a return to its basic European roots. The Com· 
munity offers both an opportunity to escape from political isolation and the best prospect 
for economic recovery. The confidence inspired by membership has reviwd in"YeStment 
activity by large fii1DS - essential especially for the country's industrial dewlopment, 
and an area where progress has been wry hesitant since the te\'Olution. Equally the Por-
tupese look to the Community for stimulus and support - not least fmancial - for 
economic restructuring, especially in agriculture. 
The latest enJaraement by no means marks the end of the Community's expansion. In· 
deed, the prospect of completion of the single European market by the end of 1992 has 
added to its attractions. Thrkey and Austria haw already formally applied for member· 
17 SptJin lllld Pbrtuga/}oln tJw .BulopGJ Community. to IJeconw Its llth  lllld 12th membmftom 1./tmUIUJI/986. 
'I'M phola! (tltlxNe 111111 oppt:JI/II) tw of  1M llplng of  the .Accadon 'l#eaty by PbrtugaJ (In Lisbon). by S/Min 
(In Mfldl1d) tl1ld by~  tt"tlre 8U10p«<ll Community on 12 June 1985.  Thi.J IWD the thin/ enltuge-
ntlnt oftlw Community. 'I'Mflnt IWD In ltJnUiuy 1973,  when Denmt»''c.lmtuui and the Unltlltl Kingdom 
.ioiMd tlw original sa IIWirlbm (&lrlum. Fwlnt%. F«<mll &public of  GermtUJy. /filly. l.ux#mboutg lllld the 
N«ltmtw:b). TM MXNid 1WU In ltl11111J1)' 1981,  when G~  }oln«<. 
'I'M photo alxNIIhows tlw &/griJiff CMmGt~y  In Lbbon with~  Prlntl Mlnl.tlef Mtu/o Soma (left) 
and Jlb.Prlnw  Mbtl.tltlr RuiMtlclwi.(CMIN)Iitlnlng the .Aa:arlon 'liB8ty. Hfrltllw tos(pr l.rMr.lllinw GGIJia 
(right). FcwlpMini.riiB I~IJMindw  b«weet~MrSotuatmdMr  Machn6 ts MrGiadlo.AndMJtti, 
PraJdent oftlw Council of  Mlnl.tlm oftlw  Bu1op«ur Community lllld F01elgn Mlnts~r  of  /filly. who sign«/ 
tM 'llwlty on bMtlff of  the Community. 
ship, while Malta and Cyprus ba~  clearly indicated that they intend to do 110 too. But 
it will be IIOIDC time before any of them actually joins, as the Community is still at the 
consolidation stage followins Spanish and Portuauese aocesaion and the most pie&Sing 
item on the qenda rilbt now issettina up the sinaie European market IUilODI the 'IWehe. 
In February 1982, by contrast, the Community had to accept a move away from expan-
sion,  when the people of Greenland voted by a narrow majority qainst continued 
membership. Oreenland had become part of the Community in  1973 by virtue of its 
belonainl to Denmark.  AlthouJh the 'Deaties make no provision for withdrawal, in 
18 This photo shows the signing ~mony  In Madrid.  with Mr Felipe GonZQ/es (right). Spanish Prime Mlnls~r. 
and Mr Fef1lllfldo Moran.  Fo~ign  Mlnls~r. signing the 'Jmlty.  Hflittng to sign (with berurJ) Is Mr Manuel 
Marin, Spanish Mlnis~r  for EU10pet111 Affairs, who led the Spanish team In the accession negotiations and wos 
la~r  appointed one of  Spain's two Members of  the EUTOpetlll Commission. 
February 1984 the Tho agreed to allow Greenland to leave the Community with effect 
from 1 January 1985, granting it the status of an associated overseas territory instead. 
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1. Aims 
The intenaifation of  efforts towards European unif'lCition after the Sec:ond \\tJrld War 
IPf'IDI from the realization that tbele wu no other sure way to put an end to Europe's 
IOlTY biltory of CODflict, bloodabed, sufferina and deltruction. Tbil underlyina CODCel'l1 
left ita mark on the tblee 'D'eltiel establilbina the European ComanJDitiel, in which the 
prindpal atated aiml are to.,._ ye and atreqtben ,.ce,  to  ac:biew-ecoaomic intesra· 
tion for the beMfit of  aU the peoples of  Europe tbroulh the aeaac.ot  alaqe ecooomic 
area, to work towards political union and, last but not leut, to ltreBithen and promote 
aocial cohesion in the Community. 
The Schuman Plan, which led to the creation of the ECSC, saw Fl'8llCO-German recon-
ciliation as the keystone of  a  new European order, with the explicit lim~  Cllltinacoodi· 
tions that would mab  war in the future not merely improbable, butimpoeaitle With the 
eatabliahment of  the European Communities this ideal became a  IWdty and  military con-
flict between the Member States is now quite unthinbble. -..n  Bwopl today, with 
the Community at its heart, forma a aenuine 'island of pea. The Community is 
Europe'a areateat achievement in the C8Uie of peace and ..  such it needa the constant 
aupport and encouraaement of  us all. What has been accompliabed 10  far lbould provide 
an ina!llti've to preaene thole aspects that haw proyed their worth and to leek to make 
improyements where shortcominp still persiat. 
Regrettably this fundamental aim of European intearation hll  tended to be foqotten 
both in the media cxweraae of  the Community and in public ........  FeopWs aenerai 
attitude to the Community, if  they take any interelt at aJt illaqDiy detenDi-'  by the 
neaatiw upecta. Wme laba and butter mountaial, for eumple, ue  viewed not mera1y 
with incomprMension but withpnuine indip.tion;in  the -~IUCh  ~people 
feel dleated bJ tleina asbd to pay such hilh prices. Reporta ~  llll!led or ~~&uine  criles 
within the Community, the IIQuabblina between the Member StiB  on key-.  affec-
tina the future coune ~  intepation, the inconclusiwnaa of  IDIIIY aummit lll'lfldnp -
all tbele tend to UDdermine public confidence in the Community'l ability to tickle the 
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II major economic and social problems of our time. For most people, Brussels - the seat 
of the Council of Ministers and the Commission- is a scene of mysterious, incom· 
prehensible goings-on, a place from where a huge and powerful bweaucracy regulates 
countless aspects of their everyday lives, usually making things more complicated and 
difficult rather than less so. 
This booklet will show many of these attitudes to be simple prejudice. The Community 
is much more than just bureaucracy, butter mountains and enormous costs. First and 
foremost it is a sure guarantee of peace; and for this reason alone, if for no other, it is a 
treasure of inestimable worth for the people of Europe. 
Ecoaomlc integration 
Higher living standards, full employment and economic expansion-these are the broad 
aims behind the economic integration of Europe through the Communities and they app-
ly, with binding force, to all the sectors of the economy cowred by the three 'Iieaties. 
The ECSC is responsible for ensuring the most rational distribution of coal and steel with 
the maximum of efficiency. Among other things, this involves securing coal and steel sup-
plies  for  the market,  regulating prices, improving living and working conditions· for 
workers, promoting trade and investment, and - more recently -overseeing the struc· 
tural adjustment of the coal and steel industries to a changed world economic climate. 
Euratom,  which  like  the  ECSC  covers only a limited sector of the Member States' 
economies, aims to promote the growth and development of the nuclear industries in the 
Community and to secure their supplies of fissile material. 
The last of the three, the EEC, is concerned with general economic integration. The ob· 
jective is to transform the Member States' separate and disparate markets into a large 
common market where people and goods can move about as freely as in a domestic 
market. 
The Single European Act has added a new dimension to. economic integration, setting 
the binding objective of completing the single E..-opean market (or internal market) by 
the end of 1992. The Community's aim is to build up a coherent, integrated economic 
framework where border checks and other obstacles will disappear, guaranteeing free 
movement for persons, goods, services and capital. This does not apply just to a single 
branch of the economy or to particular sectors of special concern to one Member State 
or another; all existing physical, technical and tax barriers that hamper the free workings 
of the market are to be remo~.  Nor is the Community going to be content with only 
modest proposals readily acceptable to the Member States. This is to be a wide-ranging 
effort to channel economic resources, in the form of manpower, materials, capital and 
investment  to  wherever  they  will  do  most  good.  The achievements  in  the  field  of 
23 economic intearation, the  setback~ and the new prospects for the future are dealt with 
in Chapter m - Ec::onomk: mtearation. 
Political iateantloa 
Althouah the  principles and measures laid down by the 'Il'eaties relate only to the 
eatablilbment and operation of  the common market, economic integration is not meant 
to be an end in itaelf but merely an intermediate staae on the road to political iatcpation. 
The Preamble to the ECSC 'Beaty exp~BeS  the resolve first of all to create 'real solidarity' 
'thmulh practical achievements' and, by 'establishinJ an economic community',  to 
create 'the basis for a broader and deeper community a.mona peoples', while the Preamble 
to the EEC 'Iteaty speaks of the determination 'to lay the foundations of an eYer cbler 
union lll10I1& the peoples of Europe'. The state of prosress towards this political objective 
is ctilcu&aed in Chapter VI - The road to political union. 
The 'Deaties also contain a social component: one of the objectives they assign to the 
Communitiea is to impnwe li'Yina and workina conditions and to strenathen IOcial cohe-
sion. In practice this translates into the guaranteed basic riaht of  freedom of  IDOYeJDeDt 
for workina people, the rilbt of e.tabliahment for the self-employed and buaineslles, the 
promotion of  equal rights for men and women, measures to safeauard the social security 
entitlements of migrant workm and to  encouraae vocatioDal training, and the establish-
ment of a Social Fund. 1'hele topics are dilcusaed in greater detail in the chapter on 
economic inqration and the Community's social policy. 
AB the  1993 deadline for completion of the internal market approaches, these basic 
achievements will have to be thouaht O't'er afrcsh and extended further, for the sinale 
European market must also include ll'ellter sdquards for all&eetions of society. It will 
not be enoush just to boost economic growth and streqthen the competitiveness of 
business and industry. Much more important is to make sure that the benefits and advan-
tages of a common economic area are fairly distributed. AheM all, this means aivina a 
share in the fruits of  the siqle  market to the people whose labour is the ultimate founda-
tion on which that market rests. There would be little point in creating a frontier-free area 
if  this were to  jeopanlize livins standluds and IIOCial protection. Its justification - both 
economic and political-lies precisely in increased social progress and the benefits it of. 
fers eYeryOne in the Community. 
24 2. Methods 
European integration has been shaped by two fundamentally different approaches-the 
'confederalist' and the 'federalist'. 
The essence of the confederalist approach is for countries to agree to cooperate with each 
other, but without ceding any of their national sovereignty. The aim, then, is not to create 
a new 'super State' embracing them all but to link sovereign States in a confederation in 
which they retain their own national structures. This is the principle underlying the work 
of the Council of Europe and the OECD. 
The federalist approach, on the other hand, aims to dissolve the traditional distinctions 
between  nation  States.  The  outdated  notion  of inviolable  and  indivisible  national 
sovereignty gives way to the view that the imperfections of social and international co-
existence, the specific shortcomings of the nation-State system, and the danaers of the 
predominance of one State over others (so frequent a phenomenon in European history) 
can only be overcome by individual States pooling their sovereignty under a suprana· 
tional community. The result is a European federation in which the common destiny of 
its peoples - still retaining their individual identities - is guided,  and their future 
assured, by common (federal) authorities. 
The European Community is a product of this federalist approach, though in a somewhat 
modified form  owing to the Member States' reluctance simply to abandon altogether 
their sovereignty and the old nation-State structure which they had only just regained 
and consolidated after the Second World War in favour of a European federation. Once 
again a compromise had to be found which, without necessarily establishing a federal 
structure, wopld provide more than mere cooperation along confederallines. The solu· 
tion, both brilliant and simple, was to seek to bridge the gap between national autonomy 
and European federation in a gradual process. Rather than relinquish all sovereignty over· 
night, the Member States were asked merely to abandon the dogma of its indivisibility. 
The first question, then, was simply to decide in what areas they were prepared to cede 
some sovereignty to a supranational community. The result is reflected in the 'D'eaties 
establishing the Communities. All three confme themselves to tbeeconamic sphere since 
this was where progress appeared most likely. 
The first steps towards economic integration were to be the establishmellt of a common 
market and the gradual alignment of national economic policies. These were the two 
main pillars on which the Community was to rest. However, they differ in their practical 
significance, primarily because - even in the economic sphere - the Member States 
were not prepared at the outset to grant the Communities full powers of overall control. 
25 To establish the common market, which was to be the basis for an economic union, the 
Community was given wide powers to formulate, shape and implement a Community 
policy. For the alignment of  the various areas of economic policy, on the other hand, the 
EEC 'neaty offers two contrasting methods: the introduction of common policies and 
the coordination of national policies. The essential difference is that common policies -
for the creation of  the common market, for example-involve transferrilli responsibility 
to the Community, whereas coordination leaves responsibility for shaping policy in the 
hands of the Member States. Specifically the EEC 'Ifeaty provides for common policies 
on trade, agriculture, transport, and competition, but for coordination in the field of 
economic and moaetary policy. 
However, with an eye to the future and the ultimate aims of European intearation, the 
lines drawn by the 'Ifeaties are only provisional. In the minds of the Community's foun-
ding fathers, the fusion of economic interests that began with the establishment of the 
Communities would automatically aenerate or at least foster conditions favourable to 
more far-reaching political integration (the functionalist approach). They believed that 
in the fmt instance the momentum of integration inherent in the 'Ifeaties themselves, 
through the establishment of a customs union and its gradual extension into a general 
common market, would be a sufficient auarantee of success. Before the Second \\brld 
War the League of Nations had described the process as follows: 'For a customs union 
to come into existence, goods must be allowed to circulate freely within the union. For 
it to become a reality, persons must be allowed to move freely. For it to have permanence, 
free currency exchange and fiXed  parities must be maintained within the union. This 
necessarily implies, ll1llODI other things, free movement of capital within the union. But 
if there is free lllO'Vement of goods, persons and capital within a given area, differing 
economic policies cannot be pursued to maintain the economic process: 
A further factor which the founding fathers believed would guarantee the continued ad-
vance of integration and act as a brake on any retrograde tendency was the Community 
institutional system set up under the 'neaties. Conduct of the tasks assi&ned to tho Com-
munity and control of the integration process were deliberately not left in the hands of 
the Member States or to international cooperation alone. Instead the 'Ifeaties set up an 
institutional system enabling the Community, in the areas assigned to it, to enact legisla-
tion that is equally binding on all its members. Under this system, there are four leading 
actors on the Community stage: the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the European 
Parliament and the Court of Justice.• 
At the centre of the stage stands the Council of Ministers, made up of representatives 
of the Member States. The 12 governments send one or more representatives to Council 
meetings-usually, though not necessarily, the ministers responsible for the subject area 
1  Thefollowinabriefauneyc:oocentrateaonlyontheeaaentialfunctiollloftbefourmainCommunityinatitu-
tions aDd il  DOt meant to be an exhaiJitiw delicription of the Community's entire institutional system. 
26 in question (e.g. foreign or economic affairs, fmance, employment, agriculture, transport, 
science). It  is the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, which take the deci-
sions  necessary for  the attainment of the goals  laid down  in the 'Ii'eaties.  Ensuring 
freedom of movement, freedom to provide services and the right of establishment, defin-
ing common policies, and establishing the Community budget are some of its  respon~ 
sibilities. 
Although the Council is primarily a forum for national interests, its members are never-
theless obliged to take the Community interest into account. It is this, together with the 
fact that under the 'll'eaties it has the power (in principle at least) to decide by a majority 
vote,  that distinguishes  it from  an intergovernmental conference.  Majority voting is 
significant not so much because it prevents individual countries from blocking important 
decisions, but rather in that it allows a large Member State which could otherwise resist 
simple politic:al pressure to be outvoted. 
In practice, however, majority voting is rarely used. The explanation goes back to 1965, 
when France, fearing that arrangements for financing the common agricultural policy 
might prove detrimental to vital French interests, refused to attend Council meetings (the 
'empty-chair policy) and so blocked all decision-making in the Council for more than six 
months. The dispute was e~ntually settled on 29 January 1966 with the 'Luxembourg 
compromise', by which it was agreed that where vital interests of one or more members 
were at stake, the Council would endeavour, within a reasonable time, to reach a solution 
acceptable to all its members while respecting their mutual interests and those of the 
Community. At French insistence the agreement also included a statement recording 
their view that in such cases the discussion must be continued until 'unanimous agree-
ment' was reached. If  even this should prove impossible, the only solution envisaged by 
the lllXembourg agreement is to note that disagreement between the Member States still 
persists. The compromise extricated the Council from the impasse, but it also meant the 
end of majority voting to all intents and purposes. No criteria exist to enable the Council 
to determine whether vital interests of one or more of its members really are at stake. It 
is left to the Member States to decide for themselves. Each of them in effect enjoys the 
right to veto any major decision by insisting on unanimity. 
The Single European Act1 si&ned in Luxembourg in February 1986largely remedies this 
weakness in the Council's decision-making capacity. Although the unanimity require-
ment has not been completely eliminated, the Act reflects a general acknowledgement 
that majority voting should be used more often than in the past. 
Essentially the idea is that in future unanimity will be required only to produce a consen-
sus between ministers on the main outlines of a policy. When putting this consensus into 
1  For the background to the Single European Act and its place in the system of Community 'lreaties, see 
Chapter VI - The Community and proaress towards political union. 
27 practical effect, on the other hand, the Council will be able to take decisions by a qualified 
majority. 
It  is proposed to use these new decision-making arrangements in a range of important 
areas such as completing the internal marlcet, promoting economic and social cohesion, 
furthering research and technological development and protecting the environment. 
Ewopean Community h«<ds of  government, foreign  mlnlstes and other dlgnlfllrla outlkk the Zappelon 
ltl/tn, Athens, following the slgnotwr of  the 'Drtzty of  Accession ofG~  on 18 May 1979./or the second 
en~TMnt  of  the European Community. In the front row are. left to right,  Wllfrled Martens, PriTM Minister 
of  Belgium. Roy Jenkins. Praldent of  the European Comm/.ulon, Gaston Thom. Prime Minis~  of  I.wcem-
bourg. Gl3ctud d'&tJJJng. Praldent of~.  Constlllrtln Caftii1IQII/Is, Prime Minister ofG~.  l«k  4mch, 
Prime Minis~  of  /~land  and Glullo Andreoni. Prime Minister of  Itoly. 
28 How far this intention will actually be put into practice in the harsh world of political 
reality remains to be seen. In view of the very cautious natwe of the move towards in· 
creased  majority  voting,  much  will  probably  still  depend  on  the  good  will  of the 
governments. 
Besides Council meetings there are also summit conferences of the Heads of State or 
Government of the Community countries. In 197 5  they began meeting three times a year 
as the 'European Council~ The true purpose of the European Council is to defme new 
objectives, giving a fresh stimulus to European integration. The European Council has, 
for example, launched initiatives on economic and monetary union, direct elections to 
the European Parliament, social policy measures and the question of enlargement. The 
Single European Act formally incorporated the European Council into the Community's 
institutional framework. It comprises the Heads of State or Government of the Member 
States and the President of the Commission, supported by the Foreign Ministers and a 
Member of the Commission, and now meets at least twice a year. 
The Commission is the engine of Community policy, the guardian of the 'Deatiea and 
the advocate of the Community interest. It is made up of 17 members who, althouah ap-
pointed by mutual agreement between the governments for a four-year term, are required 
to act in complete independence for the good of the Community. 
As the engine of Community policy the Commission has what is known as the right of 
initiative, i.e. it is responsible for makin& proposals for Community measures to the Coun· 
cil; without auch proposals the Council cannot, as a rule, take any action. As the auardian 
of the 'Deaties, its task is to see that the 'Deaties and Community law are respected and 
applied, acting apinst any infrinaements and taking matters to the Court of Justice if 
necessary. As the advocate of the Community interest it has to endeavour to steer a 
course throuih often tortuous negotiations within the Council in order to fmd an accep-
table compromise without sacrificing that interest; in this it is able, thanks to its non-par-
tisan position, to act as a mediator between the Member States. 
With the introduction of direct elections in 1979 (held every five years, the most recent 
being in June 1989) the European Parliament can rightly claim to be the representative 
of the  people within the Community.  This has greatly strenathened the democratic 
legitimacy not only of Parliament itself but of the Community as a whole. But compared 
with the parliaments of the Member States, it has yet to develop anything beyond the 
most rudimentary legislative role, for the hopes that direct elections would bring it wider 
powers were not fulfilled. It does not normally have any direct say in the Community deci· 
sion-making process, fulfilling only a consultative function  vls-d-vls the Council and 
Commission. The one exception is in the area of the Community budget, where it does 
indeed exercise far-reaching powers of co-decision placing it in an extremely strong overall 
position. 
29 Its consultative function primarily involves exercise of the advisory powers conferred on 
it by the 'Deaties, under which Parliament may deliver opinions on Commission pro-
posals before the Council tabs a decision. But its influence on the Council's decisions 
is relatively sliaht since its opinions are not binding. Besides these advisory powers, it also 
enjoys an extensive right under the 'Ii'eaties to put questions to the Commission - and 
in practice to the Council too. It thus bas the opportunity for direct political dialogue with 
both of them. 
Parliament also bas a supervisory role, but this is confmed to the Commission. Principal-
ly this means that the Commission bas to defend and justify its position in public debates 
1'1le E1110p«111 Commi&Jion at  113 ,..U.  weekly mMing  In the &rlaymont building. llrusseb. This Comm/.J-
slon took o~  In lanUIUJI/989./orafour-y«q tum. It l.s thejlnt Comml.ulon to haw womm among Its 
mttmbm. and ltl.s the 1«01111 to 1¥ praJded by Mr Jacqws DdJn. a  .forme  Flr:nch Mlnlsi!B for Economy 
and Ji'lnitnc¥. 
S.tlJd  QJOUN/ the tllble me M1 Wmo l'tlpturdreou (~~et~mt to the camMJ), and clockw/M from her: Sir Lion 
Brittan (Vice-Praident). Mr Mtlrla Filippo Pandol/1 (Va-.PraidMt). Mr AI¥/ Matula. Mr Manwl Mtuln 
(Vice-Praidml), Mr Frans A.ndrla.vn (Vb-Praldtmt), Mr Carlo Rlpa dJ MetUIII. Mn C1lrfstiiiM ScriwMr. 
Mr lt11111 Dolltk/Jngw. Mr Kiwi Urn Mien, Mr Rlly Mac Shlury. Mr ~  Millan, Mr A.nt6n/o Canlato e 
Cunha. Mr Henning Clrrlslophmm {Yb-Praldstt). Mr lt~Ct~WS Delon (Praident). Mr David WIJlJamson 
(Secmtuy-Geneml).  Mr P«N Schmldhuber and Mr Martin Bangemann (Vice-Prelltknt). 
30 before Parliament in full session and present an annual general report on the activities 
of the CommUnities for discussion. Ultimately the Commission is responsible to Parlia· 
ment and it can even be forced to resign by a motion of censure carried by a two-thUds 
majority. 
Parliament's  position  within  the  Community  institutional  framework  is,  then,  un-
satisfactory from the point of view of the Community's democratic legitimacy and the 
Single European Act has failed to produce any substantial impnwement: Parliament's 
only real involvement in decision-making concerns the accession of further Member 
States or the association of non-member countries. Otherwise, the Council of Ministers 
continues to have the fmal say. 
Nevertheless the new cooperation procedure introduced by the Single Act for all major 
decisions on the completion of the internal market should help to strengthen Parliament's 
influence on the Community decision-making process. This is not the place to go into 
the procedure in detail, but the basic innovation it introduces into the Community's 
legislative process is that proposals on such matters are given a second reading in the 
Council. 
At the fmt reading, the Council adopts a 'common position' (which amounts to its version 
of a Commission proposal)  by a qualified majority vote.  Parliament then  has  three 
months in which to do one of four things. The fust two possibilities are for Parliament 
to approve the common position or to allow the time-limit to expire. In either case the 
next step is quite straightforward: the Council goes ahead and passes the legislation set 
out in the common position. However, Parliament may also reject the common position 
or propose amendments to it. Either way the Council can still impose its view (though 
the method differs). If  the common position is rejected, the Council can pass the legisla-
tion at the second reading only by a unanimous vote-otherwise it has to drop the deci· 
sion altogether. Since unanimity is very hard to obtain, this effectively blocks the whole 
process and as a rule Parliament will only reject a common position in rare instances. 
More usually it proposes amendments, in which case everything bangs on whether the 
Commission accepts them or not. If  the Commission does accept them, the Council can 
decide  by  the  normal  procedure,  in  other  words  by  a qualified  majority  (or  by  a 
unanimous vote if it wishes to depart from the Commission's revised proposal). If, on the 
other hand, the Commission does not accept them, unanimity is again required for the 
Council to act. Generally speaking, then, it is difficult for Parliament on its own to impose 
its will on the Council. If  it wants to get its way, it has to win over the Commission. Even 
so, the Council can still apply an emergency brake by refusing point-blank to take any 
decision at all on Parliament's proposed amendments or the Commission's revised pro-
posal, again bringing the legislative process to a halt. Nevertheless the cooperation pro-
cedure does, all in all, represent a considerable step forward in the Community's decision· 
making. 
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The interinstitutional cooperation 
I 
Appnwalor 
no comment 
procedure 
u  (Me~  u 
Propou1 
u  ~·  ..  *D 
Opinion 
u 7 0 
'Common polition' 
u 7  u 
Amendment by 
almlute majority 
u = u 
I  I 
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Rejection Parliament's tilt must now be to concentlate ita etforts on expkidna tbele pmnrilinJ 
new IWil1Jei and dMiopina etfectM new strateaies to Coalolidl&e ita position in the 
Community l)'ltem. 
The Court of  Justice fA the European Communitiel COIIIilta of 13 judps l8ilted  by six 
~Ita  taat is to uphold the law in the interpldatioo and application of 
the 'Deaties and acta adopted by the Council and the CorrnnWjon. From the wry  outlet 
it appacbed  ita task not merely u a pwely judicial~  but in 1 broider. actiw law· 
makina spirit, tlesbiDa out the basic principles of Community law to lay a firm bmda· 
tion for  intepation and tbeleby riahdy earninJ a reputatioll aa one of ita foremost 
cbampions. 
l..ookina at the approach choaen by the CommODity's foundina:fatbers in the liabt of ex· 
perience to date. two conclulioaa emerp. The tint  is that the def:ilioo to leltrict iDteara· 
tion initially to the economic sphere wu riaht. The exiltence of a UDifled European 
economic area bas ai\'ell a substantial impetus to bade between the Member States. 
Alonpide the USA. the Community ia now the world•s peateatecoaomic power. It  plays 
a prHminent put in Y«Jrld bade. aocountina for 11101e than 1 third of aD aport~  and 
importsifiDtla-Coanunity trade ia included. Tbele few ~y  demoaltlate that 
the Community is a wry taqible factor which cannot be ipored  by the Member States 
and which bu  pro¥edita worth ua  IOlidand useful buis for cooperation and ClOIIilteoce. 
In IDOtber apect. ~  tho expectatioaa of thole who irMpbecl tho fouDdina of the 
CommUDity ~  not been fulfilled. European inteption bll not 1utomatkally pro-
Jreaed towards the ultimate political pis  which they held. Some of  the Member Sta1a 
continue to inliat on retainina an inviolable core of aomeiiDty. 1i'aDaferrina further 
powers to  the Community is felt to be too hiah a price to pay tor the ~  benefits 
which they would stand to pin. In the last 1a0rt they eYide tbe economic or political 
praawa to expiDd exiltina common po1iciel or to formulate IDd implemeat new ones 
by Uliq their wto on the pounds that vital national intereltl me at stab. 
Wbatil needed here is 1 renewed effort for further decilka  toCOIIIOlidlte what bu  been 
acbiewcl. to 1oaer the uew dMJopmenta that ue  under way. to-conect the abortcomiDp 
that haw emapd and to auide the Community cautioully. u reality dictate~. towards 
the ultimate pi  of poHtica1 union. Seen in tbilliabt, Euro1110 intearation po1e1 a 
ceueless cbaBenae to all thole concerned, and ita propas  aod ..uzation  depend elleft· 
tiaJiy on the poJitical will of the Member States. 
33 III. Economic integration 
1.  The common market 
The focal point of economic integration is the common market, in which the Member 
States have combined to create a unified economic territory undivided by either customs 
or trade barriers. This common market rests on the pillars of  four fundamental freedoms: 
the free IDO\'efllent of goods, persons and capital, and freedom to provide services. 
First and foremost it aDows capital and Jabour - two basic facton of production - to 
develop their potential untrammelled and unhindered. Workers can move freely to seek 
jobs where demand is hiaher and wqes and working conditions accordinalY better. They 
can settle with their families and 10 to work anywhere in the Community. Firms can pro-
duce and sell their goods in free competition wherever suits them best. No Member State 
may live ita own nationals preferential treatment over those of its Community partners. 
1b create this large European internal market-which, with the entry of  Spain and For· 
tupl,  now hu  to ICl've almolt 320 million people-the Community countries have had 
to dismantle aU manner of trade barriers, harmonize le&isJation, administrative practices 
and tax structuJes, and extend their cooperation on monetary policy. 
In  ~nm-up  to the economic deliberations of the European Council in MiJan on 28 and 
29 June 1985, the Commission prepared a White Paper liltina all the meai1JNI still re-
quired for the completion of the internal market and settina out a detailed timetable for 
their implementation by 1992. At the Luxembourg European Council in December 1985 
the Heads of State or Government endorsed the Commission's objcc:tiYeS and gave the 
go-ahead in· the Sinale European Act.  AU the neceasary decisions on customs tariffs, 
freedom of movement for  the  sclf-emp~. the services sector, the liberalization of 
capitaliDOYCIDCilts and air and sea transport, and the approximation of Jaws and ad· 
miniltratiw rules are now scheduled for adoption by 1992. 
The proapects for success are good, since it was apeed at the same time that all these 
decisions - cuept those on tax harmonization, the free  movement of persons, and 
workers' rights - would be adopted by majority 'YOting,  whiJe special temporary ar-
rangements would be allowed for Member States which encountered problems in im· 
plementing them. 
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I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  i  I  I  f  i  I  I  I  I  I  I  I The followina IOCtions describe the dewlopment of the internal market so far and the 
CUJ'I'ellt state of  pro&l'eiS. 
(a) 11ae caRom~  IBion llld free mmement of Roods 
The fmt step in the creation of the common market was to eliminate all the customs 
duties levied on imports and exports between the Member Statll before the EEC was 
establilbed. The EEC 'Beaty laid down a fiXed timetable for the padual dilmantlina of 
thele internal duties within 12 years. The ori&inal Six had no dit!iculty in meetina the 
deadline, and the last customs barriers came down in 1968, 18 monthl ahead f111Cbedule. 
The later entrants also succeasfully met the tight deadlines set for removina their pre-ac· 
cession customs duties and adapted to the requirements of the common market IU!pris-
inalY quickly. 
The elimination of customs duties within the EEC was accompanied by the establish· 
menton 1  July 1968 of a  common tariff  (CCO. settina up a sin8le CUitoms barrier UOUDd 
the entire Community for all imports from non-member countries, with duty normally 
beina levied when  aoods enter the economic territory of the Community.  This was 
necesaary in order to prevent divmion of  trade flows. When the CommODity was found· 
ed, wide dilpuities exilted between the Member States in their rata of external duty. 
These were wry hiah in France and Italy, for example, but low in the Benelux countries 
and Germany. Without a common customs tariff, French or Italian importers could have 
evaded the hiah rates at home by taking adwntage of the leiDCMl of internal duties to 
import through qenta in low-duty countries and then transport ~&oods  to France or 
Italy. This could eYentually bawled to the ridiculous situation of  a Bordeaux wine mer-
chant aettina cheap Spanish corks via HambUl'J. 
The ccr  rates have frequently been adjusted since 1968. This is done either unilaterally, 
by a decision of  the Council of  Ministers, or through negotiations betv.wn the Communi-
ty and individual non-member countries or other international orpnizatioas, especially 
within the framework of OATI (General Aareement on 1'ariffl and 'Dade). Since 1975 
the proceeds from customs duties form part of the Community's awn t'eiiOUJ'CC8 and are 
paid over to it  by Member States. The introduction of  a common external tariff siJil&}led 
completion of the fmt staae of economic integration: the establishment of a customs 
union. 
The creation of a laqe European market on which all aoods can be freely traded requites 
not only the removal of customs barriers but the liftina of quantitative reatrictions too. 
These are desiped to protect a country's industries, wardina off foreian competition on 
the domestic market either by a temporary or indefinite ban on certain imports or alter-
nat.Mly by reatrictions on their value of volume {quotas). Meuwes of this tiDd are pro-
hibited by the 'Iteaties and this ban has, in the main, been respected by the Member States 
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since the expiry of the prescribed transition periods. Intra-Community trade, then, is also 
free of all quota restrictions. 
One obstacle to the free IDOYellleDt of  goods within the EEC whi<:h still persists is what 
are known as 'meuures havina equivalent effect' (to quantitative restrictiona). These are 
measures which, thoup not actual prohibitions or quotas, have an indirect impact on 
intra-Community trade by makina it expensive, diffiCUlt or well nigh impossible to import 
or export certain aoocJa. W'ltb structural problems in a number of major industries (steel, 
shipbuildina, textiles}, rilina unemployment, and escalatina imports from low-cost pro-
ducina countries, Member States haw been increasinaly tempted to erect protectionist 
barrim, thereby excludina other Member States' goods from their domestic markets and 
hampering intra-Community trade. 
This is a game at which the Member States have shown a considerable degree of  imagina-
tion and in&enuity. It starts at the frontier, where, despite much simplif'ation, certain 
formalities continue to cause tedious and costly delays. The pressing need to solw the 
problems facing freqht transport was hiJhlighted by the incidents which occurred at the 
Italian-French and Italian-Austrian-German borders in the spring of 1984. 
The Council of Ministers took a major step towards streamlining frontier formalities in 
December 1984 when it introduced a single document for intra-Community freight to 
replace a whole series of forms from 1 January 1988. 
Agreement has also been reached on combining border posts at the Community's inter-
nal frontiers. This means that the remaining formalities required when goods or people 
cross the border are confmed to the customs entry post, already making bolder croainp 
a lot easier. 
38 But once across the frontier, goods still face countless bans or restrictions in the form of 
a vast array of national rules and reJU}ations prescribing -·in  the interests of health, safe· 
ty, oonsumer protection or fair oompetition - their exact make-up and labelling. These 
ranae from rules on product ingredients and packaging to technical safety and industrial 
standards. Paradoxically, they succeed in crippling the sale of forei&n goods to the advan· 
tage of domestic products even thoush they apply to both alike - the reason being that 
they vary 80  widely from one country to another. A  clear indication of the extent to which 
the Member States make use of auch obstructive measures are the 250 or 80 oomplaints 
that arrive on the Commission's desk each year. These the Commission in~tes  and 
if  it fmds the measures in question contrary to Community law, the Member State con-
cerned is requested under a special formal procedure to amend or desist from the offend· 
ing rules or practices. If  the Member State fails to  comply with the request, the Commis· 
sion can refer the case to the Court of Justice, whose decision is binding. In this way a 
whole range of rules and measures have been rejected by the Court as incompatible with 
Community law, so averting more serious dislocations of free trade between the Member 
States. 
When followina up infringements of this kind, the Commission endeavours to go beyond 
individual cases and fmd more general solutions based on mutual recosnition of national 
technical standards. The principle of mutual recognition is that any product of merchant· 
able quality which is lawfully manufactured in one Member State may be marketed in 
another. It applies even where the technical standards govemiq a product are not the 
same, provided there are adequate guarantees of consumer safety. Thanks to mutual 
recosnition, foreign  household e1ectrical appliances such as refrigerators and cookers 
now enjoy easier aoc:ess to the French market, fittings and decorative items can be sold 
freely in Spain, and chipboard can be used in Germany -even  though they do not meet 
the relevant national technical specifications. In the area of foodstuffs, mutual recosni· 
tion has opened the French market to Italian salami, the German market to tinned meat 
containing certain additives, the Italian market to low·aloohol beverages and the Greek 
market to confectionery - with the proviso in each case that the products concerned 
must  be  of merchantable  quality,  lawfully  manufactured and  marketed  in  another 
Member State. 
The only definitive solution to the problem, of course, is to make all the national rules 
identical, especially the many differing technical standards. At the same time a boost 
needs to be given to the work being done by the European Committee for Standardization 
(CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (Cenelec) to 
draw up European standards. Only when this has been done and when the Member 
States' systems of value-added tax and excise duty have been alianed will it be possible 
to claim that there is genuine free movement of goods within the Community. Checks 
on goods moving between Member States oould then be dispensed with. 
As we have just noted, a key element here is the need to reduce the disparities between 
Member States as regards taxes on trade. There are two basic reasons for the continued 
39 existence of tax borders. Fintly, they ensure that taxes levied on the consumption of 
goods traded in the common market (known as indiJect taxes) are paid over to the riaht 
Member State, in other words the State where the aoods are actually consumed (this is 
known as the destination principle). At the moment this is done by Jl'81ltina tax remission 
on exports. So if  an item manufactured in Germany is exported to France aud ronsumed 
there, the German exporter am back the indirect tax paid ill  Germany, wbile the French 
importer pays the correspoodina French tax. In the end, of  course, it is tbeCOlliUIDer who 
foots the bill, as the tax is passed on. The system thus enaures that domestic and imported 
products in competition  with each other  receiw rouahlY  equal tax  treatment.  Tax 
borders, then, are the inescapable price that has to be paid for this advantage. 
In the second place, tax borden play an important part in combating tax evasion and 
pre\'elltina the diwnion of trade. Without tax borden and the associated frontier con-
trols, no check could be kept on wbetber aoods bad actually been exported. This would 
open the way for unacrupuloua dealeft to declare aoods as exports and claim a refund 
of national indirect taxes without actually JOin& throuah with the transaction. They 
could then either pocket the money straiaht away or use it to undercut their competitors 
by aelJina the goods on the damlstic market at a much reduoed price. If  there wme no 
border controls, MD  priwte individuals would be abJc to stock up on conaumer aoods 
wbemoer the tax rate was lowest and the goods therem  cheapest. Thil would seriously 
diatort trade and reduce trldors' tumaYer - and hence also tax reYenue - in hiah-tax 
countries, especially in border areas. 
In the praentcircumatancea tax borderund the associated frontier controll are the!efote 
eiSODtial. Of oowae, this doe& not  mean that a frontier-free system of  taxation is imposs-
ible; but it does mean that the pr!lellt system needs a radical overhaul to set the staae 
for the removal of tax bontm. If  the objectiloe of COIDJ)Ietina the linale market by 1993 
is to be achieYed, resolute adionl on this front must be a hiah priority. 
~)  Free IIMMIIK!IIt of worbn 
Freedom of mCMIDent for workers is already largely a reality in the Community. The 
riaht of  all Community natioDals to equal treatment in terms of employment, waps  and 
other workiq conditions within the Community, enshrined in the 'Deatiea, was com-
prWDsiwJy ~in  the  1968 Council Rqulation on freedom  of JD<Mm~ent. In-
dividuals are I\WIIlteed popapbical and occupational mobility and a minimum level 
of IOCial intepation in the Member State where they choo&e to work. 
Geopaphical mobility ellQOIDPISIIeS a person's riaht to ao to another Member State and 
remain there for the purpo~e~  of  aeekiDa or takiq up employment. At the moment the 
riaht of residence auaranteed under Community  law is still only three months  for 
someone seekina work in another Member State, whereas ID)'ODe with a job enjoys a 
guaranteed right of ftllidenoe for fM )'W'I, with a poaibJe extenaion lor a further fM 
40 years. Under certain circumstances people may even stay on where they are after retire· 
ment; but there is no general right -yet for pensioners to spend their retirement wherever 
they please. 
National immi&ration authorities cannot refuse to grant someone the right of residence 
guaranteed under Community law (particularly on the grounds of public safety, order or 
health) except in extremely serious cases, and any such refusal can be challenaed before 
the Court of Justice. The Commission's declared aim is to continue diamantlina the re-
mainina restrictions on the right of residence until any Community national can live 
anywhere in the Community for as long as he or she wants. 
Geographical mobility also means giving Community nationals an opportunity to better 
their situation by applying for jobs anywhere in the 1\velve, and to help them do so the 
Community has set up an information exchange system. At present it is still at the trial 
stage, but eventually people will be able to fmd out locally about job vacancies wherever 
they want and to apply for them or advertise for employment. 
Occupational  mobility  covers  people's  pursuit of an  occupation and  their terms of 
employment and working conditions. Here again, nationals of  other Member States may 
not be treated differently from local workers. They are, for instance, entitled to the same 
pay, free access to the labour market, admission to trainina establishments or retraining 
centres or to re-employment in the event of redundancy. 
Then there is social integration, which means the right of a worker to all the general social 
benefits which the h08t country offers. In other words, workers from other Member 
States are entitled to the same rights and privileges as local people when it comes to ac· 
commodation (including access to subsidized housin&), trade union activity or social 
security assistance, for example. They and members of their families are entitled to all 
the subsistence allowances, student grants, maternity benefits or reductions on public 
transport or other public amenities that are normally a-yailablc. Members of their im· 
mediate famijy (i.e. spouses and children) are also free to take paid employment or to work 
in a self-employed capacity, while children are entitled to general schoolina and can enter 
into apprenticeships and vocational training on the same terms as local children. 
lastly, Community regulations on social security guarantee employees and the self· 
empio)'ed, includina members of their families, adequate cover not only as regards family 
allowances but also in the event of illness, disability, occupational accident or di&ease, 
unemployment, death of a close relative, and old aae. The point is a~  all to ensure that 
no one 1oaes out or is penalized in terms of social security entitlements as a result of exer· 
cising the right to move freely within the Community. 
Howewr, the free movement of workers guaranteed by these measures will not succeed 
fully in practice until the iinauistic, social and cultural difficulties of  integrating workers 
and their families into the working and social life of their host countries are overcome. 
41 This requites not only the equality of lepl status already achieved, but above all the 
emergence of a true sense of commUDity among the people of the Community, rooted 
in the basic idea of European unity. 
The Community itself baa launched a wide range of schemes in  an effort to promote the 
buic  oonditions which will allow people to exeJcise their riaht to free lllOYement. Promi-
nent among these are a sc.beme to encourage student and staff mobility a.mona univer-
sities (the Erasmus Pf'OIJ'IIDIDe), a plan to stimulate international cooperation and inter-
cbanae amona European reeearobers (Science), and the European Jtratqic proaramme 
for research and dewlopment in information tecbnolQiies (Esprit). 
(c) RIPt of t!ltablllluneBt IIHI fnedoBl to )II'O'fide aenlees 
Members of  the professiont and the self-employed are also. in principle, auaranteed the 
riaht to establish themaelwem busineu and provide their services wherever they like. The 
knowledae, skills or qualifations required of anyone wishina to set up on his own ac-
oount in another Member State or to provide a servk:e durin& a period of temporary 
residence may not be any different from what is required of that country's nationals. Con-
versely, Community citizens are aasured equal rights in another Member State only if 
they  satisfy  the  same  oonditions  as  apply  to that country's  nationaJs.  They  must 
tbelefore, for example, be able to show that they have oompJeted any vocational trainin& 
required, or passed the neceuary examinations and obtained the relevant qualifications 
in their host oountry. Since tlley will not normally have been able to do so, these freedoms 
42 will continue to count for very little in practice until the conditions for setting up in a 
self-employed capacity are brought into line or until the Member States recognize each 
other's degrees, diplomas and other qualifications as equivalent.  · 
The work of putting Community  leaislation for  the mutual recognition of degrees, 
diplomas and other qualifications on to the statute book has proved to be an extremely 
slow and difficult task, not least because the original idea was to adopt separate Com-
munity legislation for each individual profession. The greatest and almost the only head-
way made along this path has been in the health professions, with the adoption of a 
number of Council Directives enabling general practitioners, specialists, nurses, mid-
wives and veterinary surgeons to practise in any of the Member States. Chemists and ar-
chitects have also subsequently joined the list. The only gain for lawyers, on the other 
hand, is that the provision of services has been made somewhat easier. They can now act 
as legal advisers in other Member States and bring actions in the courts there provided 
they are assisted by a lawyer from the country in question. But the crucial issue of the 
mutual recognition of legal qualifications, so as to allow lawyers to establish practices in 
other Member States, has proved impossible to resolve using this case-by-case approach. 
However, at the end of 1988 the Community managed, as part of its drive towards the 
single European market in 1992, to bring in a system for the recognition of higher-educa-
tion diplomas that involve at least three years' study and qualify their holders to enter 
a recognized profession. As a matter of principle, the scheme avoids laying down a single 
set of criteria as to the type of studies involved and relies instead on the principle that 
anyone who has completed a university-level course entitling him to admission to a pro-
fession  in  his  home  country can  be  deemed  to  be adequately qualified  to  practise 
anywhere else in the Community. Since educational standards are high in all the Member 
States it would be absurd to argue that people lose the skills they have acquired the mo-
ment they cross a border. Even so, there are speciftc national features and differences be-
tween university courses which mean that some adjustments do have to be made. 1b cope 
with this problem, adjustment courses andhr aptitude tests may be held, or certain re-
quirements imposed as regards pmrious professional experience. The Commission wants 
to introduce similar arrangements for other vocational qualifications too. The main sec-
tors concerned are the hotel and catering industry, motor engineering, the building in-
dustry, electrical engineering, farming, horticulture, forestry, and the textile and clothing 
industries.  It is planned to bring out a Community description of occupations and 
qualification requirements in these fields  to help workers fmd jobs in other Member 
States where they can make the most of their qualifications. Eventually the aim is to in-
troduce  a European  vocational  training card giving  information about the holder's 
qualifications. 
43 The free lllCMIIlellt of  capital and libnlization of  payments is one tA the by  factors for 
the completion oftbeaiqle marbt. AU the Member States acknowledae this. In the 1ona 
run fleetrlde in IQOdl IIIHemceiCIIDDOt be susqilled uniMacapital too il  fleeofftltric-
tionl. Capital must alwaya be able to flow in the direction where it can be wed lllOit  efti. 
ciently in economic terms. 
At the IDOIDfllt oaly Germany, the United Kinadom. the Nedlerlands, Belaium and lux· 
embourJ have lifted aH Mltricdont 011 capital JDO¥eJDeDts. France, Italy and Dlllmark 
BtiU llltrict short-term capital me 1 1  'lbldl and transfmntier financial aedita, while con-
troll in Ireland, cn.:e. Splia llld IUtuplm MD stricter. Tbeao mainly apply to 
.-:IIDta, for example matinl it iUelal for them (a:ept perbaJ3I on c:main conditielll) 
to hokl foleian  currency  accouatl, conduct  money  marbt tr1D1ac:tioDa,  or acquire 
foreian securitiea.ln lllid-1988, bowlwJr, a major  breaktbrouah was made wbeothe Com-
munity manapd toaet definite cfeadliDes for removiq the mnainina nltrictiaaa, so let· 
tiqtbe  1Wehe on CXJUIIO b'  a  COIIIJ'kiDly free capital marbt  by 1992. France, Italy and 
Denmark will haw to liberalize capitaiiDCMDlellts fully by mid-1990, while Spain, Por-
tupl, o.ce  and Ireland baw  beea aruted a traD.Iitiooal ananaement untill992 (with 
the 1M*ibi1itJ of  an extenlioa of  up to  tluee )'Uri for Greece and Fortupl). Eleatually 
the Member Statl!l will only be aBoed to impose reatrictiooa-lubject to aPPftMl bt' 
tbe CnmmWim - u  a protectiw meuure in the evmt of major abort-term eapHal 
JDCMIDeDtl puttiDa the c:urreacy 1Dilbta  and excbanae rata under_,  heavy pra~UR. 
1bia ia not an. boMver. The aeaaon of a free capital market also calli for other Rep~ 
and, in particular, for 101De meaure of imtitutional alipii'MIQt. At the moment, the rules 
pwnina aedit inltitutiolll opaq  on the capitallllll'bts '¥81')' quite Olaiderably 
fmm ooe Member State toanatber. Tbe need b  •Hinment il  especially acute in theme 
ofbaDtmpervilioaandllfeaulldtfordepositon, uwelluCMr  tbequeltion olfleMiom 
of Mablilbment for credit iDICitutioalin the~  The Commiei<m hu  allady 
--to tactle theae-- ancl bu  pat forward IMrll  proposala for diftlctiwa to the 
Couacil. 
It il-.ntial  tbat the flee movement m  .,oos. penons, and capital and freedom to pro-
vide lervicellhould be ICCOIDPIDied by meuurel to liberalize payment traDIICtiom. 
Anytbiq tbat bampen paymenta for pda  detivered abroad, the payment of ...  to 
Community citizeal wortiq  in other Member Stata or the payment of chqel  for •· 
vice& pJOrided maba it difficult, if  DOt alfolltber i~  to am:ile tbele buic 
freedoms. The Member Statel muat therebe allow such paymentl to  be made in the cur-
rency of the Member State in whidl the creditor or recipient resides. 2.  The common policies 
The c:ommonmarket is the nucleus of economic intearation around which the Communi-
ty's common policies mulve. These policiea are: the OOIDIDOD qricultural policy, com· 
petition policy, transport policy, and commercial policy (which ill discusled in detail in 
Chapter V - The Community in the world). Ute the eatablisbment of the common 
market, the conduct and implementation of  the common policies il  theexdusive pJ'ellme 
of the Community and its institutions. In these areas the Member States bave transfmed 
SOYereiplty to the Community and granted it the power to formulate and carry out its 
own policies. 
Aaricultwe, aaoneoftbe 'foundationaofthe  Community~  playt a  key role in Community 
policy. It accounts for much the larplt proportion of  CommUBity lePlation and more 
than two thirds of expenditure under the Community budaet. 
There are two reasons why it is such a major conc:em. First, enawina the security of  food 
supplies ia traditionally one of the main areas of State activity. And the only way to do 
this is to attain more or leu complete self-suffiCiency, which means a teDdeDcy to over-
produce 10 as to JU8181ltee supplies when hamata are poor.  Second, qriculture is a 
special cue amona productive sectors, since it is dependent on factors-such u climate, 
soil and dileue-ow:r which man has little control and which often result in major flue· 
tuationa in barwlts, thus affectina farm incomes. These incomel must be hiah enough 
to pnllei'W the family-run farms necessary for self  -ltlfficiency and to ptevent such people 
from. leaving the land. In tlUa Jelpect qricultural policy allo fulfill the roles of incomes 
policy, employment policy, structural policy, rqional policy, and population policy. 
In-view of qricultwe'l fundamental importance for the aenml wU-beiDJof the people 
of the Community as a whole, the BEC 'Beaty bad to include rulea on the eatabtisbment 
and oqanization of  a  common qricultural  marbt. H~  tbele were couched in '\'el'Y 
broad terms 10 as to permit the existing national control mechaaiun• to be brouabt into 
line araduallY· 
The main linea of  the common qricultural policy were laid down immediately foiJowina 
the entry into force of the EEC 'Beaty at a specially convened conferenc:e held at Strela 
in July 1958. The IDOit diffiCult problem was to incorporate the diffelrent natioaal ayltems 
in a common s)'ltem ol  market orpnizationa 1011 to create a CommuDity-wic»market 
for qricultural  products. To start with, all tariff IDd trade burien  between the Member 
States had to be etimiDated. In addition. a COIDIDOil pricina system had to be introduced 
to auarantee uniform price leYela for farm products in all the Member Stata 
4S This involves three types of price, which serve as the main instruments of the common 
agricultural policy. The system centres on the target price, which is the price that Com· 
munity fanners are ideally supposed to receive. This price is fiXed every year by the Coun-
cil. H  the actual market price for a product drops below the target price as a result of over· 
supply, the Community intervenes in the market to stabilize the situation. The point at 
which it does so is determined by the intervention price, which is the price at which the 
intervention agencies set up for this purpose in the Member States have to buy up the 
product  concerned  in  unlimited  quantities  (marketing  guarantee).  The intervention 
system thus guarantees Community farmers a minimum price for their products when 
they cannot earn more on the marlcet, so as to ensure that they receive an adequate in· 
come. In order to protect prices within the Community and agricultural production as 
a whole, thmihold prices are set. These are minimum prices for agricultural imports into 
the Community.  For many products they are higher  than the  world marlcet prices, 
because growing conditions in other parts of the world are more advantageous. 1b prevent 
the Community marlcet from being flooded by cheap imports from non-member coun· 
tries to the detriment of European farmers a levy is imposed to bring import prices up 
46 to the threshold level. The levies, like customs duties, are part of the Community's own 
resources and revenue from them is entered in the budget. Comersely the Community 
pays agricultural exporters a refund, i.e. an export subsidy to offset the difference between 
the world price and the Community price. This enables Community farmers to sell their 
products on the world market despite the fact that their prices are generally higher. 
The cost of operating the common agricultural market is financed throush the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). The Guarantee Section of the 
Fund, which consumes by far the greatest proportion of resources, principally covers the 
cost of the minimum price guarantee and export refunds. The Guidance Section provides 
funds for structural improvements in agriculture. Originally the Fund was fmanced by 
the Member States direct, each contributing a proportion in accordance with a special 
scale. but since 1970 it has formed part of the Community budget. 
~· 
Angry  /anntn dmlon&tlrltlng.for a ~Inc~  In farm prm  lnvtlde tlw lfWtlng oftlw CouncU dl.lcus.slng 
agrlcultwe on JS  F~bruiU)Il971. bringing two cows with tlwm-right up to tlw 14th floor oftlw Council's 
offlce building In .Brus.vls. 
This, then, is the basic theory underlying the common agricultural policy; it forms a 
cohelent whole that is consistent with the aims and objectives described earlier. Putting 
47 the theory into practice, however, bas posed a number of problems. Setting prices that 
were out of  line with market conditiomled to surpluses, which, because of the open-end· 
ed Commitment to buy up products, bad to be fmanced by the Community rather than 
the farmers. This in turn led to the accumulation of large stocks - the much-publicized 
butter, fruit and waetable mountains and the wine lake - which entail substantial 
storage costs and can only ultimately be reduced at best by special sales and at worst by 
withdrawal from the market (as in the case of perishable products). 
It is mainly because of such operatio111 that the common agricultural policy bas come 
in for growina public criticism. However, it would be over-hasty to oondemn the entire 
policy  simply  because of these  abenations  and sbortcominp and  from  there,  as 
sometimes happens, to call into question the utility and purpose of European integration 
in aeneral. The problems are due less to the system itself than to its implementation. 
Reforms are essential and proposals have been submitted. 
In 1985 the CommissiontapOnded with the publication of  a  Green Paper on the penpec-
ti\a tor the common qricultural policy, settina out the various waya in which these 
sbortcominp cou1d be corrected. In  particular, it put forward some new ideas on how 
to  contain  qricultural production  and  on  restorina  market  balance  by  reducina 
surpluses. 
Apicultural policy would be made to reflect the actual market situation more cloaely, the 
main piOpOII]s being: 
(i)  Prices  policy  should  be  more  fmnly  market-oriented.  The  resultina  drop  in 
qricultwal incclmes would be cushioned by specific income support. Althouah it is 
still expensiw, this approach maba more effiCient use of  avaiJable funds since tbec:ost 
is far leu than for the starqe and dispoaal of surpluses. 
(ii) The intenention mechanism should be adjusted and made more flexible. For exam-
ple, price and buyiua-in guarantees could be temporarily suspended or quotas could 
be introduced. 
(fu1 Alricuhuralland could be taken out of production in return for a set-aside premium 
and the land inYolYed put to Iona·term non-agricultural uses for ecoloP:al niches and 
J.eiswe parks, for instance for planting more forests. 
(iv) An early retirement schellle should be brought in to enc:ouraae older farmers to Jiw 
up fannin&. 
(v) Alternatiw crops, such as timber or fruits in short supply in the Community, should 
be developed and promoted and new outlets opened up for agricultural produce, 
especially in the industrial sector. 
The agriculture ministers haw already taken a number of decisions alona these lines as 
reprds milk, meat and cereals. 'lb ~e~tore market balance in these secton (with inoome 
support for the farmers affected), prices haw been frozen and the conditiona for intenen-
48 tion bal'e been cbanpd. At the II8IDe time the need for a drutio llductioo in ,IJIOductioo 
was confirmed. 
Thil ileiiCOUIIIial. but  only a  start in a lona·term procaa  &o malll Buropeu  qriadture 
men eftk:ient IDC1 marlrzt-orieated. 1b JeiCb tbat ultimatC pl  willclllfor an.me. and 
pell8¥el'lllCe from  eYei')'OM ilooll'ed in the inteleltl of the CammUDky and aU its 
citizen&. 
(b) Collt«ih  ,alley 
The COIIIIIlOiliDilbt for the aoack produced by industry and qriculture can operate 
IIIDOOthly only if  coaditioDI ~competition  are unibm.  Tbil il  the oaly way to~ 
equaHty of opportuDity for aB in tbe common marbt  and to pm1lllt  .aioD tbatM!rta 
competition by the priwte or public aector or by aovemmeat. OM~  the Community's 
tllb il thoaebe to create a syatem to protect free competitiaa witbill tbe W"HIOD 
IIJII'bt, bued·OD the competition rulel Jlic:t down in the 'Deatia Tbele ndel pmlilit 
.....-nta  between undertakiDp to llltrict competition and Ill  farma ~._by  an 
enterptile ~a  domiunt pollition oo tbe marbt, for eumplt., impc•nauullir pra.  or 
limitinapredudicm, ....ats,  or teclmic:al dti+ekl&wuent; tbey allo ba  ar pllceuaclra' the 
Commilllion's aupervilion natiooal sublidiel (State aida) to  iDdmdual firms or lleCton ~ 
industry in Older to preva~t tbem from pinina an unfair~  ldwatqe. 
The Commiainn enaurea that tbe principles ~fair  competition are at.  WJCl in the com-
mOD marlrd aDd puniabes infrinpments with heavy fiDeL ·"'••'rt.ed by the Court of 
1uadce. it il  allo  reapoDiible tor refinina the competition rules 10  that tbey are fully effec. 
tne. The tat  flciDa the Community - now 11 in the put - ia the laborious one of 
dcYelopiDa tbe wide armoury of rules and individual decilionl neceiiUY to put the 
eatablilbed JWinciplea into practice. 
Under the BEC 'Beaty tr1n1port policy, like qricultural  policy, wu  intended to  be a  com-
mon policy area. But VfllJ little baa emeqed in the way~  OOIDIDOQialutionl in tbilcom-
pa  eector 10 tar. The indMdual typea of tramport - in particulllr I'Oid fleiaht, the 
railwap, and inland waterwaya-still lllply  rely on the old nata.llltructulei.ID  dUa 
they ue blclrld by  the  Member StaB wbicb,. far a wriety ~  IIIIIIDal (ecooaalk, 
popaphica1, political, and biatoric:al), still want to  punue their OWD tlanlport ltratePB. 
Momw the difficultiea faciq a common tl'aniJ)Drt policy haw~  evm further 
since enla!pment. 
Beca111e of the dilcrepancy betwMl the 'Dealy JeqUilemeDt a  a common tlaDiport 
policy and the PfOIIa& actually made, in 1982 Parliament, bacbd  by the CommlaMn, 
49 brought an action qainst the Council before the Court of Justice on the grounds of the 
Council's failure to act. 
In May 1985 the Court delivered its judgment, partly vindicatina the position taken by 
Parliament and the Colllllliuion. After seekina to clarify the specifiC obliptions which 
the EEC 'li'eaty impo&es on the Council in thil connection, the Court concluded that the 
Council was indeed bound to act to ensure freedom to provide services within the Com-
munity-somethina which had been auaranteed since 1969. In this respect the Council 
had failed to adapt the appropriate measures and rules, its main tasks being to guarantee 
international and transit traffiC between and through the Member States and to lay down 
the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate transport services in other 
Member States. But the Court refused to condemn the Council outriaht for its failure 
to introduc:e a common traDiport policy, since in the case of transport, unlike agriculture, 
the 'li'eaty did  ~ot set out a detailed timetable or inventory for completion. 
The judgment also reflects the Court's policy of not intervening in political disputes be-
t\Wen Community institutions where their rights and obliptions are not sufficiently 
clearly spelt out. The Court of Justice cannot be - and refuses to become - an alter-
name IePJature in the Community. Nevertheless, the ru1ina bad a decisive impact, 
promptina immediate moves to liberalize transport. The Commission has since preeented 
a ranp of proposals to the Council aimed at giving transport operations real freedom to 
provide services and at removina the remaining technical and physical barriers. 
so In the area of freight transport, any road haulier will be allowed to operate between the 
Member States from  1993 onwards provided that he is professionally competent, is of 
good repute, satisfies certain financial requirements and can produce evidence of at least 
three years' practical experience in the business. Controls and formalities between the 
Member States are also to be eased considerably by bringing in uniform checking pro-
cedures and longer opening hours at border posts, concentratins checks and confining 
them to random sampling, and extending the range of documents that are mutually 
recognized.  This does not mean that checks will be abolished completely, but it will 
reduce waitina times at frontiers substantially, resulting in lower costs for hauliers and 
shippers. In the medium term, the aim is to shift legal controls on road haulage and inland 
navigation away from the borders to inland locations. 
As far as ocean shipping is concerned, the Community has already adopted a package 
of measures to open up the shipping market and combat national protectionism effective-
ly so as to ensure free competition. In future, ocean shipping operators will also be given 
full freedom to provide services. 
For some years Community policy on air transport has been geared towards gradually 
dismantling the web of regulations governing capacity and fares. Routes already being 
served between Member States must be opened up to competition. The computerized 
reservation systems operated by the airlines will be an important factor here. The Com-
munity's approach has already produced benefits for both business travellers and private 
passengers. The choice of routes is now wider and regional links with the main European 
air network have improved. Further moves now under way to dismantle pricing and 
capacity restrictions will work to the consumer's advantage by favouring the emergence 
of a much greater ranae of services and pushing down fares. The Community must, 
however, take care to ensure that the rapid growth of air-traffic is accompanied by more 
effective  government  planning  of  airports  and  air-traffic  control  facilities.  The 
bottlenecks already evident in the air and on the ground make it abundantly clear that 
the air-traffic system needs to be adapted to cope with rising demand. 
3. Economic and monetary policy 
The Community's founders fully realized that the creation of the common market and 
the effective implementation of common policies would have to be accompanied by a 
common economic and monetary policy. It was clear that the gradual establishment of 
the common market would lead  to growing economic interdependence between the 
Member  States,  making  it  more  difficult  for  them  to  pursue  their own  short-term 
economic policy objectives. Conversely economic and monetary measures adopted by 
one country  would have a considerably greater impact on its partners as economic 
51 interdependence pew. It. wu therefore essential  to establish at least some common 
pound in these policy areas. 
However, when the Community was founded no one bad sufficient couraae to braw the 
leap forward to a  oommon economic and monetary policy that would lead to ec:onomic: 
and monetary union. The Member States were not pJep8red to yield their sovereianty 
to the Community in matters of monetary, budptary and fiscal policy. Instead, the com-
mon aims of national economic policies wete laid down, whereby the Member States 
committed  themaehes  to  the  JO&]I  of full  employment,  price  stability,  balance  of 
payments equilibrium and cunency stability. The six foundina memben also resolwd to 
coordinate their economic policies in close consultation with the Community institu· 
tioos. But responsibility for formulatina and implementina economic policy was to re· 
main the sole preropti~  of the Member States. 
It wry  soon became apparent that the realities of progress in coordination fell far short 
of expectations. Although is wu generally held to be of vital importance for the con· 
solidation of European intcaration, the great step forward to economic and monetary 
union prowd impoaible to achieve. 
At the 1969 Hque Summit the political leaden of the Community launched a  111M' in· 
itiati~ for economic and monetary union. The Council and the Commission were in· 
structed to draw up a timetable Bettina out the stqes for its achievement. A committee 
wu aet up under the cbairmanlhip of Pierre Wmler, the Prime Minister and Finance 
Minister of  lmemboura, and in October 1970 the committee presented its fmal report. 
The 'Werner Plan' envisqed three stqea on the road to economic and monetary union, 
S2 aiming  to  achieve  the  final  stage  ('Communitization'  of  national  instruments  for 
economic and monetary control and their use for common ends) by the year 1980. On 
22 March 1971 the Council adopted a number of decisions, to be effective retroactively 
from 1 January, openina up the way for the fmt stage of economic and monetary union 
to begin.  . 
But as early as April 1973 the Commission presented a soberina report to the Council 
on the initial stqe. The Member States had achieved hardly any pqress  in coordinating 
their economic policies. Under the pressure of acceleratina inflation  ~rywhere  and 
violent fluctuations on the international fmeiJn exchange martds, they all preferred to 
seek refuge in unilateral national action rather than to embark on a common c::oune with 
the  prospect  to  medium-term  success.  Their  political  will  to submit  to a common 
discipline and to make effective use of the Community armoury was IICrifK:ed to the 
desire for abort-term gains.  N~rtheless the Community endeawured to keep to the 
timetable for economic and monetary union, with the second stqe due to begin in 
February  1974. However,  the attempt failed  and the second staae n~  got off the 
JI'Ound. Instead the startina date merely saw the adoption of a number of individual 
measures to improve and extend the ranae of instruments available for monetary policy 
and the coordination of economic policies. 
The setting up of the European Monetary System (EMS} in March 1979 pve a new 
dimension  to European monetary cooperation.  Its purpose  was to create a zone of 
monetary stability in Europe as free as possible of wild currency fluctuations. It was 
primarily becauae of  the volatility of  exchanae rates that European fmns hadfouabt shy 
of undertakina major,lona·term investment projects in other Community countries and 
had been unable to take full advantage of  the common market. With frequent unpredic-
table shifts in exchange rates, fmns found that making broad economic calculations had 
become little mme than a game of roulette, and the stakes were too high for their liking. 
The EMS seeks to achi~  its objectives of internal (price) and external (exchanp rate) 
stability by means of a system of  fixed but adjustable JUidance rates restina on a variety 
of intervention and credit mechanisms. The obligations impoeed on Member States by 
the system and the way in which it operates have led to areater c:onwqenoe between the 
ec:onomic and monetary policies of the Member States, with the rault that it is generally 
held to be a success. This is demonstrated most notably by the 3% rate of inflation 
teeorded in the Community in 1986, the lowest rate in 20 :years. 
Within the system the 'ecu' plays a central role. (The name has a dual parentage: it stands 
for 'European currency unit'; at the same time it allo revives the name of a 13th century 
French aold coin). The ecu comprises a 'buket' of the currencies of the Member States, 
each currency accounting for a proportion which  is determined on the basis of the 
economic st.reqth of the country in question. The exact value of the ecu in terms of each 
currency is fixed ~ry  day by the Commission and the rates are published in the OjJlclal 
Journal of  the Europet111 Communities (C series). 
53 The ecu fulfils four functions: it is the reference unit for the exchange rate mechanism; 
it acts as an indicator to determine when one CUI'I'eDCY deviates from the others; it serves 
as a unit of  account for transactions under the intervention and credit mechanilms; and 
it is used for sett1inJ debt& between national monetary authorities. It is also used as the 
unit of  account for the Community budaet, and aU specifJCexternal duties, levies, refunds 
and other internal Community payments are expressed and settled in terms of ecus. 
In priwte transactions the ecu offers businesses, workers, and the ordinary citizen protec· 
tion qaint sudden fluctuations  in exchange  rates.  For banking purpoaes it &IMady 
operates as a fuUy-fledpd Buro-currency, being used for private and busineu savinp and 
CMI'drafts, especially by small and medium-sized flJ'IDS and independent operators. The 
hope is that people will ultimately be able to use the ecu in any Member State as an accep-
table alternatiw to the national currency.  But this pi  is still a lona way off, and 
economic and monetary poJicies will baw to pow much closer before it becomes a prac-
tical proposition. 
Seen in a broader context, then, the pursuit of  economic and monetary union is still wry 
relevant to safquanlina the acbiewments of the common market and ensuring the con-
tinued progress of European integration towards the goal of Ewopean union. 
The Single European At::t therefore SOUiht to revive the pi  of economic and mone&ary 
union by writin& into the EEC 'Beaty a bindina commitment on the part of  the Member 
Statat to work ~  to brina it about. Acting on the instructions of the Heads 
of State or Oovernment, a committee of  experts chaired by Jacques Delors, the Preaidcnt 
of  the  Commission, met to CODSider ways and means of acbiering this objecti've. Their 
~lusio~  tnown as the 'Delon Plan: were put before the Madrid European Council 
in June 1989. 
The plan envisqes the establishment of  economic and monetary union in three stqes. 
The fU'It step is to bring the pound sterlina, the drachma, the escudo and the peseta into 
the achaqe  rate mechanism of  the European Monetary System by mid-1990 so tbat it 
covm all the Community cumncies. Economic policy in the member countries is also 
to be more clo&elyCOOJdiaated tban in the past. The second stqe  would invohe the adop-
tion of new treaties Jl'8dually transf'errina national powers in the areas of  fiscal, monetary 
and exchaqe-rate policy to the Community institutions. In the thi1d and fmal staae an 
independent central bank system would be set up, paving the way for the introduction 
of fixed exchanae rates (or a single CUI'I'ency). 
In Madrid the Heads of State or Gavmunent qreed in principle to go ahead with the 
fll'lt stqe, holdina out the prospect of  an intergovei'IUllelltal conference on how to pro-
ceed to the second stqe once the necessary preparatory work was completed. 
54 4. Energy policy 
EneraY policy is a crucial factor for the continued growth and development of the Euro-
pean ecooomy. Although the ~unity  1JIOd to be laqely self-cufficient in eDelJY IUp-
pliel, it hu  <MJ'ibe)'UI'I becomedaqerously dependent-daqmoua  in both econamic 
and politK:a1 terms - on a number of countries outside Europe, particularly the oil-ex-
poniaa couatriea. The consequences for the security of suppliea aad price stability were 
dlamatic:allybrouahthomebythesuddenhoaeoilpricerisesin 1973and 1979. 'lbeCom· 
munity was forced to reapond with a new enei'JY strategy. The flllt  ltepl in the direction 
of a common energy policy halw already been taken. 
HM tlw QuMt II1Hilr a~  piQqw at tlw o.f!lcltll DPMin6 oftlw ~  OJmmwltty~  JET 
taMidl  prqj«:t "'*' nucl«u  fu.tlott at Culhllm. &pJnd. 9 Aprl/1984. Pramt  Ill tlw  opMing IWII! Pratltlmt 
~  Mltlllmllfd of  FnuiCI (back to tlw armeirU Mr  Gt111on Thom. Prw1t1Mt of  the Bulopetm Commb-
61on. tllld ,...,.,tlva of  tlw countrla Jlllftlt:lpGIIn Ill tlw 1'8IJII1Ch. 
ss AU the Member States accept that even thouah they may continue to pursue national 
eneiJY policies, there is also a Community dimension which requires the coordination 
of national measures, the completion of  specifiC Community programmes, and the defini· 
tion of fundamental Community objectiws in this field. The primary objectives up to 
1990 are to break the fink between economic growth and energy demand, to keep oil im· 
ports below a certain ~1.  and to increase the proportion of power generated from coal 
and nuclear eneiJY. In order to auarantee adequate energy supplies up to  199S and 
beyond, the Commiaion in 1985 put forward a series of new Community enei'JY objec· 
tiws reflectina the chanps on the eDei'JY markets. These objectiws indicate the path 
which the Member States should follow and to that extent they are evidence of  general 
qreement on the broad lines of the policy to be pursued. But a true common eDei'JY 
policy is still a loq  way off and a wide range of specific problems and conflicts of interest 
between the Member States remain to be resolved. 
In 1988  the  Commission  completed  an exhaustive  inventory  of all the  remaining 
obstacles to freedom of trade in the Community eDei'JY market. The aim now is to work 
towards completion of an internal eDei'JY market by gradually bringinJ these obstacles 
down and so helpina to increase security of supplies, briq costs down and boost com· 
petitiveness. Here qain, the Community will have to inch its way cautiously towards its 
aoai; but integration is the only sure way to secure its future enei'JY needs. 
5. Resea1eh and technology policy 
Relearch and technoloiY pose one of the greatest challenps facina the Community to-
day. Advances in this field are crucial for its political and economic future if  it is not to 
fall hopelessly far behind the USA and Japan in the relentless technololical race of the 
modern world. 1b this end it must mobilize its true wealth: the creative spirit and energy 
of  ita people. This potential is the basis for its scientific strenath and competitivenesa, on 
which rests the hish technical and scientific quality of its industry and agriculture. 
The balance sheet of achievements is quite impreasive. Starting from the 'Ii'eaties on coal 
and steel (ECSC) and the peaceful U&e of nuclear eneray (Euratom), a comprehensive 
European research and technology policy has ciel'eloped mer the past 30 years and more. 
The Community supplements and concentrates national research with its own extensive 
scientific and technical research pJ'OII'aiDIIles. This a'YOids unnecessary duplication of  ef  · 
fort and ensures the rational and effective use of funds. The Community is therefore prin-
cipally concerned with research propammes which: 
(a)  can for greater fmancial, personnel and technical resources than can easily be mobi· 
lized by the Member States individually; 
(b)  inwlve projects that can only be properly tackled across national frontiers, such as 
protection of the environment; or 
56 (c)  acne to promote completion of the internal marbt (e.g. tht definition of  commoo 
standardl). 
Rmeardl propammeaareadopted on a propoaal from the QwnmjMjnn andean  be carried 
out in one of tlne  way&. 
Dlrlct tiCtlon - DiJect action projects are carried out by the Community's own Joint 
Rmealch Centre, which has IOIDe 2 300 staff em~  in establilbmentl in lspra ataly), 
Oeel (Belaium), Karlsruhe (Germany) and Fetten  (Netherland~). 
Contlllet 1ISI!Q1C/r - This il  carried out by uniwnities, laeUCh ceatlll and industrial 
f111111 oa a alwecklolt buis. 
Concened tiCtlon - Here the Commisaion acts primarily u a ooontiaator between in· 
dividual national projects, ensurina the neceaary compatibility. aad smooth flow at in· 
formation. 
The  practic:al  manifeaation  of these  buic principlea  of Community reiCIICh  and 
tecbnoloiY  policy  is  the  framework  programme  drawn  up by  tbe  CommiMjoo for 
1984-87. This leta the followina pis  for the Community'• numerous ldentific aad 
technical activities: 
Promoting  lndu.ttrkll  comp«<ttvenas  through  the  Esprit  (European  strategic  pro-
aramme for research and development in information technoloaY), Brite (buic ftiiiWCh 
in industrial teclmololies for Europe) and RACE (MINICh and dMiopmeat  in adlUCed 
communication technololiel for Europe) propammea and 'V1riou1 bioteclmoloiY pro-
pammes. 
lmptrJVtng tiM use of  energy throuah propammea on controBed thermonuclear fusion, 
which includes the mT project (Joint European 'lbrus) in Culham (UK). In operation 
Iince 1984, it  is considered theiDOit powerful nuclearfuskm teatillltallation in thevald. 
In addhion tbeJe are raearcb propammea on non-nuclear eneqy (lolar eneiJY, energy 
from biomul, wind eneqy. potbermal eneqy, ratiooal uae of eneqy), reactor safety, 
manarment and atorqe of radioactiw: waste and the clrmmmjlljnnina of nuclear in· 
ltallationl. 
lm]Jff1lllng tiM u.v ofnzw m11tmals, with proarammes on metall and minerall, recyc1ina 
non-ferrous metals and aubltitution and materials technolol)'. 
lmPff]Ving llgrlcultural compB/tll¥MSS. with propammes on the uae and manqement 
of land and fisheries  reaourc:es, on productivity in animal and crop farmiDa and on 
structuftll. 
lmptfJtllng /lvlngtmd worlclngcondJttons. with propammes on environmental protection 
and climatoloiY, radiation protection and medical raearch. 
lmptf1111ng  tJte ..tflctiCY of  the Community's scMntfllc tmd technlctll potmtiQ/,  With 
meuwea to promote scientific and tecbDical coopaation and pdpqe  in Europe and 
work on fcncutina and useasment in science and technoloD 
S1 Reinforcing development aid through research into agriculture in the tropics and tropical 
diseases. 
Despite the relatively modest funds allocated (in 1985 the Community research budget 
amounted to only 3% of the total Community budget and 2% of national budgets) and 
the  cumbersome  nature  of  the  decision-making  procedure  in  the  Council  (where 
unanimity is required) the Community's research programmes have triggered off wide-
ranging cooperation across national frontiers in practically every major area of scientific 
and technical research. In addition to this there is the prospect of broad technological ad-
vance on an unprecedented scale following the agreement reached in July 1985 in Paris 
on European Thchnological Cooperation (known as the Eureka project) between 17 Euro-
pean  countries  (the  12  Member  States  of the  Community,  together  with  Sweden, 
Finland, Norway, Austria and Switzerland). 
With the rapid advance of science and technology worldwide, the Community must press 
ahead in this direction, further strengthening its joint research actitivies. The Communi-
ty's leaders are fully aware of the challenge and the Single European Act reflects the 
general agreement that research and technology policy - which up till then had been 
based on Article 235 of the EEC 1ieaty 1 - should have its own place in  the EEC 
lfeaty. 
1  Article 235 of the EEC lieaty states: 'H action by the Cooununity should prove necessary to attain, in the 
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this 'freaty 
has not provided the nec:eaary powen, the Council shall, actina unanimously on a propoul from the Com-
mission and after consultina the Asaembly (European Parliament), take the appropriate measures: 
58 IV. A Community for the people 
Any political system must attend to the needs of the people living under it, and the Euro-
pean Community is no exception. The Community endeavours to do this in two ways. 
First, all measures for economic integration arc also geared towards the goal of social pn> 
gress. The basic freedoms of the common market, for example, encompass not only the 
economic objective of a large internal market but also the individual freedoms which 
guarantee Community citizens a minimum measure of persOnal self-realization transcen· 
ding national frontiers. Second, the Community has been able over the years to extend 
its responsibilities to various policy areas which directly affect the social life and well· 
being of its people. The door to significant progress was opened at the Paris Summit in 
1972, when the Heads of State or Government agreed on the need for a common ap-
proach on social and regional policy, the environment and consumer protection. These 
are the policy areas which we shall look at in this chapter. 
1. Social policy 
Because of the high level of unemployment in the Community, especially amana young 
people, social policy is coming to be regarded more and more as the touchstone of Euro-
pean integration. 
The fmt outlines of a Community social policy can already be seen in the 'Deaties of 1951 
(ECSC) and 1957 (EEC and Euratom). But the underlying assumption at the time was 
that the workings of the common market which they sought to create would more or leu 
automatically bring the Member States' different social security arrangements into line 
with one another. The 'Ireaties therefore did no more than sketch out the rudimentary 
features of a Community social security model. Apart from guaranteeing basic freedom 
of movement within the Community, they only specifically covered equal treatment for 
men and women, social security for migrant workers, vocational training and the estab-
lishment of a Social Fund, 
By the early 1970s, however, the Member States came to realize that this minimalist view 
of the Communities' role in social policy had been overtaken by events. Experience had 
shown that the economic mechanisms of the common market did not automatically lead 
59 to social progress and full employment. In 197 4, therefore, the Social Fund was OYerhaul-
ed and the Community adopted  a social action programme comprising some 40 measures 
aimed at full and better employment, improved liviD& and working conditions and in-
creased involvement of the social partners. Achievements so far include Directives cover-
ing worker protection against the hazards of noise and certain dargerous substances, 
equal treatment in the workplace, safeguards against mass redundancy, workers' rights 
in the event of takeovers, and worker security when fll1ll8 go bankrupt. 
The  world recession of the late  1970s and early  1980s and the resulting economic 
pressures on the Member States, plus soaring unemployment, led to the formulation of 
a plan to take the idea of the common market a stage further and establish a true internal 
market. But this was not simply a response to the challenge posed by world economic 
trends and the breakneck pace of  technological development; there was, too, a realization 
that the Community could only asaert and consolidate its economic cohesion in the face 
of international competition if  it also strengthened its social cohesion. It became accepted 
that Community  social  policy  needed  to  be  expanded  just as  much  as  economic, 
monetary and industrial policy. 
The major changes introduced in 1987 by the Single European Act included &ivin& the 
Community wider powers in the social field to enable it to press ahead with the coherent 
European social policy on which it had already embarked. The social dimension has thus 
become a vital part of the single market project, the aim being not simply to boost growth 
and strengthen competiti~ness but to make fuller and more effecti~ use of resources 
and to distribute the benefits more fairly. 
After all, the whole exercise would be pointless if  it were to jeopardize people's liviD& stan-
dards and levels of social protection. Its justification lies precisely in the social proaress 
and benefits which it will generate for evel'}'One. 
The level of occupational mobility within the Community is a key factor for the success 
of the single market, but at present it is too low and will therefore have to be encouraged 
as the internal market gradually takes shape. This means providing better opportunities 
for workers to exercise their right to mOYe and settle freely in practice. The Commission 
is also working to raise training standards, with the focus on encourasin& shemes for fur-
ther training and the rapid intepation of }'OUJll people into working life.  Improving 
health and safety at work is another major problem being tackled by the Commission, 
the emphasis here being above all on rules for the protection of workers exposed to hazar-
dous substances. 
The key issue, however, and the main focus of concern and effort remains the fl&ht apinst 
unemployment. Completing the internal market marks the start of a process that will also 
stimulate job creation throuahout the 'IWelve. But even with the accompanYing measures 
to reinforce social cohesion, it will not bring about an immediate reduction in unemploy-
ment. So in the interim there will ha~  to be a further increase in the resources made 
60 available under the Community's structural policy (especially the Social Fund) to combat 
long-term unemployment and help young people fmd work. 
Projects assisted by the Social Fund range from training in new infonnation technology 
to aid for migrant workers and vocational training for the disabled. The balance to date 
is impressive: over 915 000 persons under 25 have been given basic vocational training 
on leavina school; more than 420 000 young people have been given additional training 
to improve their qualifications and 480 000 persons of all ages have found employment 
under the job creation measures. 
Finally mention should also be made of Article 119 of the 'freaty, which requires men 
and women to be given equal pay for equal work. This amounts to a guaranteed fun-
damental right for women workers in the Community - a right which they can enforce 
vls-d-vls their employers through the national courts. In the mid-1970s women's rights 
were substantially strengthened by three Directives which extended the legal guarantees 
of equal treatment at work beyond the field of equal pay so as to include access to employ-
ment, vocational training, working conditions and promotion, and social security. 
The Commission has  proposed underpinning the foundations of Community social 
policy by means of a Social Charter of basic rights which will reflect the European model 
of society, social dialogue, and the rights of each and every individual in the Community. 
2. Regional policy 
In the Preamble to the EEC 'D'eaty the Member States declared their aim of 'reducing 
the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less-
favoured regions'. The Community set about the task with the creation of a number of 
structural Funds. The centrepiece is the European Regional Development Fund (known 
as the Regional Fund for short), which was set up on 18 March 1975. The Social Fund 
also operates along regional lines in the sense that the level of assistance available for 
labour market measures is geared to the scale of the problems facing each individual 
region. lastly there is the EAGGF Guidance Section, which helps to finance structural 
measures in rural areas. With effect from  1 January 1989 the Funds were completely 
overhauled so as to give them a much greater impact: assistance is to be specifically 
targeted  towards  national  schemes  to stimulate  investment  and  create jobs  in  less-
developed regions, so helping to reduce the disparities between rich and poor regions of 
the Community. The key element in this reform is the doubling of the Funds' resources 
between 1987 and 1993, rising from ECU 7 800 million in 1988 to ECU 14 100 million 
eventually. The money is to be allocated among regions according to five objectives: 
Objective 1 - Regions whose development is lagging behind; 
Objective 2 - Areas affected by industrial decline; 
61 Objective 3 - Combatina Iona·term unemployment; 
Objective 4 - Combating unemployment amona )'OUDI people; 
Objective S - Speedina up the adjustment of qricultural structures and promotina the 
development of rural areas. 
Objective 1 encompuaes larae parts of Spain aad Italy, the whole of Gteeoe, Portuaai. 
Ireland and Northern lleland, the Fmlch Overseas Departments and Corsica. A lilt of 
the teaiona to receive aid under the other objectiws is currently beiDa drawn up using 
more general criteria. 
This reform entails a mauiw effort on the part of the Community. But it is yet another 
Clllential component of the internal market project, sin<le one of the aims is precilely to 
reduce reaional disparities within the Community. 
3. Environment and consumer protection 
The 'Deaties make no explicit teference to environment and consumer protection u one 
of the Community's tasks. The explanation is principally that the thteat to the environ· 
ment and the risks facio& the consumer were less readily apparent when the Rome 
62 Treaties were signed in 1957 than they are today. It  is, however, characteristic of the Com-
munity -and  clear evidence of the dynamic force of integration -that  it has been able 
to adapt its range of policy instruments to suit the changing needs of the times and society. 
The Community's environment and consumer protection policy was launched at the 
Paris Summit in 1972, when the Heads of State or Government declared protection of 
the environment and the consumer to be one of the Community's most important and 
pressing concerns and called for the preparation of action programmes to set such a policy 
in motion. The Commission responded by drawing up a series of detailed and comprehen-
sive programmes which have since been steadily refined and expanded. Originally the 
legal basis for this action, as for research and technology policy, was Article 235 of the 
EEC 'neaty; but under the Single European Act environment policy has now been given 
its own place in the Treaty. 
The main areas of progress in environment policy have been the prevention and monitor-
ing of air and water pollution, the disposal of used oil and other wastes, the control of 
chemical pollution, and the preservation of wild birds. 
In 1986 the Council of Ministers adopted three new environmental programmes propos-
ed by the Commission focusing on:  · 
(i)  the causes of acid rain and the effects of small quantities of heavy metals on health; 
(ii)  climatic research into the effects of deforestation and the improvement of fossil fuels; 
(iii) limiting the technological hazards in the chemical and petrochemical industries. 
In the field of consumer protection, a whole series of Directives on health and safety have 
been issued, notably on preservatives and additives in foodstuffs, industrial goods, tex-
tiles, motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals, and cosmetics. There have also been important 
Directives on product liability and misleading advertising.  Further Commission pro-
posals on door-to-door sales and consumer credit are pending before the Council. 
But with the rise in pollution levels and the growing risks to the consumer, all these 
measures are no more than a step in the right direction. Many more comprehensive and, 
above all, preventive measures must follow. However, promising initiatives often come up 
against major obstacles because of their implications for other policies (especially com-
petition and social policy). A striking example was the recent controversy surrounding 
the fitting of cars with catalyst converters. This merely serves to highlight the need for 
unrelenting determination to keep sight of the medium-term and long-term objectives. 
The creation of the single market, however, promises to ease matters considerably and 
make for appreciable progress in all these fields. The economic growth it is expected to 
generate presents not only a challenge but also an opportunity to attain a high level of 
protection. Protection of the environment and consumers, tnen, is yet another key aspect 
of the  1992 venture. 
63 V. The Community in the world 
The Community is the lalpst  sinalc tradina block in the world and as sucb plays a leadina 
role alonpide the USA on the world stqe, with intetests in practically every corner of 
the llobe.  More than  100 countries  ha"Ye diplomatic milsiona to tbo Commuaity in 
Brussels. while the Community itlelf has representatiw offiCeS throuahout the world and 
at all the major international orpnizations. This is partly a reflection of  Europe's respon-
sibilities for peace, freedom and prosperity in the world; but it allotena  to fulfd a wry 
basic need, giwn Europe's economic dependence on a wide variety of  imports (e.g. eneqy 
supplies, raw materials, fmiahed industrial IOQds). 
The Community has been given wide powers for shaping its economic relations with the 
outside world. The position is, h<Jwewr, delicate sin<::e these powers are in potential con· 
f1ict with the general foreip policy J)O\ml which the Member States haw, by tradition, 
always retained. The instruments available to the Community \lDder the 'lieaty for shap-
ing and aaserting its position in the world ra111e from a common oommercia1 policy, 
to association aareements with individual countries or groups of countries and a Com· 
munity deYelopment policy. 
1.  Common commercial policy 
Presentilll a common front to the world at J.arae, in other words to non-member coun-
tries, is the reverse side of the creation of a unified internal market. It was therefore logic:al 
that foreign trade should be an area of common policy. ~bility  for the precise for· 
mutation of this policy lies with the Community, whose main tub  are to fiX and adjust 
common customs  tariffs, to conclude customs  and trade agreements,  to  harmonize 
meuU~a~ Hbetalizing trade with non-member countries, to plan export poliey and to 
decide on action to protect trade, particularly apinst  unfair tradin& practices (e.a. dump-
ing or subsidies). It would be impossible to give a comprehenaiw review here of all the 
Community's activities in the field of commercial policy. 1\vo aspects, bOMYer, deserve 
special mention. 
The Community plays an active part in international neaotiationa for the development 
of world trade which are held under the auspices of  OA1T or Unctad (United Nations 
65 Conference on Trade and Development). It has concluded numerous agreements to pro-
mote trade and wider economic cooperation. Recently it has also increasingly been in-
volved in efforts to resolve trade conflicts, negotiating with Japan, for example, in order 
to open up the Japanese market to European goods and products. In order to protect 
crisis-hit industries in the Community, particularly steel, it has concluded a number of 
'self-restraint' agreements with non-member countries to prevent the European market 
from being flooded with imports. Conversely, it has itself agreed to self-restraint as regards 
European exports of steel to the US market. 
The second notable aspect is the Community's relations with the State-trading nations 
of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (commonly known as Comecon). Until 
the mid-1970s, these countries refused to recognize the Community as a negotiating part-
ner, with the result that a Community approach in relations with them was impossible. 
But since then their attitude has shifted. A joint declaration on the opening of official 
relations between the Community and Comecon was signed in I..Dxembourg on 25 June 
1988, providing a framework for future cooperation, and talks on the form and substance 
of trade links are now under way between the Commission and the Comecon Secretariat. 
Nevertheless the fact remains that, for the moment, formal agreements exist only be-
tween the Community and some individual State-trading countries (such as Romania, 
Czechoslovakia and  Hungary) or  between individual Member States and Comecon 
countries. By a special arrangement, the Member States are allowed to maintain and 
renew these agreements, even after the transfer to the Community of aU responsibility 
for foreign trade policy. They may not, however, conclude new agreements. In order to 
preserve good neighbourly relations and to promote the continued flow of trade with 
Comecon, the Council of Ministers adopts unilateral import arrangements pending the 
conclusion of new trade agreements with the State-trading countries. 
2. Special trading arrangements 
(a) Assodadon agreements 
Association agreements establish special links with non-member countries extending 
beyond the purely trade aspect to include close economic cooperation and financial 
assistance. They can be divided into two categories. 
Agreements to maintain the special relationships that exist between some Member States 
and certain non-member countries 
The main reason for introducing arrangements for association was to accommodate the 
special economic links which some overseas countries and territories maintained as a 
66 result of their former colonial ties with Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands. 
Because of the considerable disruption of trade with these countries caused by the in-
troduction  of  a  common  external  Community  tariff,  special  arrangements  were 
necessary in order to extend to them the Community system of unrestricted trade. At the 
same  time customs duties on goods from  these countries were lifted. Financial and 
technical assistance is dispensed by the European Development Fund. 
Agreements to prepare the way for possible accession or with a view to the creation of 
a customs union 
Association  arrangements are  also important  in  preparing for  the accession of new 
members. They form a kind of preliminary stage to accession, designed to help a country 
that has applitid for membership to bring its economy into line with the rest of the Com-
munity. This approach proved its value in the case of Greece, which obtained associated 
status in 1962. Another example is the association ag~eement  signed with 'Thrkey in 1964; 
this, too, holds out the ultimate prospect of accession. 
(b) Cooperation alfeements 
Cooperation agreements are less comprehensive than association qreements, their aim 
being merely to promote intensive economic cooperation. The Community bas conclud-
ed agreements of this kind with such countries as the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria and 
'Thnisia) and Mashreq (Egypt, Jordan, l..ebanon and Syria) groups and with Israel. 
3.  Development policy 
For the Community, promoting relations with the developing countries is not merely a 
question of economic necessity in order to secure its supplies of raw materials and to ex-
pand the markets for its goods; it is also a token of solidarity with the less prosperous and 
poorest countries on earth. 
The most significant expression of this concern is to be found in the Lome Conventions 
of 1975, 1979 and 1984, which have formed the basis for cooperation between the Com-
munity and many African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. Between 1975 and 
the end of 1985 their number had grown from the origina146 to 66, reflecting the need 
to allow the 'overseas territories' which gained their independence over that time to main-
tain and develop their economic links with the Community within a framework of part-
nership. 
Under the lome Convention exports from the ACP countries enjoy duty-free access to 
the Community market and quantitative restrictions are prohibited; only in the case of 
67 TM  P«JJJk of  I.omi lt!om about tM  .rigning of  tM  first Loml Convention lnllugurating close cooperation and 
aid b«ween the EurofJ(NUI Community and  46 countrlts in Africa. in the Carlbbeon and In tM  Rzc{fic. In LPml. 
7bsa on 27 February 1979. By 1985, the number of  ACP signotorles to the Convention's successor. the thllri 
LPml Convention, hod grown to 66. 
a few agricultural products are there special arrangements. Discrimination is prohibited 
as regards the right of establishment and freedom to provide services. 
Another notable aspect is the system set up to stabilize export earnings (known as Stabex). 
This is designed to offset the negative effects of major fluctuations in world prices for 
certain raw materials on which the ACP countries' export earnings laiJely depend (e.g. 
tea, coffee, cotton, groundnuts, bananas, timber and leather). 1b fmance the scheme the 
Community has set aside ECU 925 million under the third 1Dm6 Convention (l.om6 un. 
If  an ACP country's export earnings for a given product in any year fall6% or more below 
the average level over the previous four years (1.5% in the case of the poorest countries), 
it can request a transfer from this furid. Since 1Dm6 II there has also been a system to 
support mining products-known as Sysmin-for which the Community has earmark-
ed  ECU  415  million  under  1Dm6  III.  The  scheme  allows  ACP  countries  to  claim 
(repayable) assistance in the event of reductions in production capacity owing to falling 
world prices or some other factor. The Community has also agreed under Lom6 III to 
68 make BCU 7 160 million available in the form of subsidies, special loan~, risk capital and 
low-interest loans for development projects, particularly in agricultwe, infrastructures, 
eneqy, industry and fiSheries. 
Lutly there is the Community food aid PfOiliiDDle, which amounta to some ECU 500 
million a year. Thia form of dewlopment aid is steadily aainin8 in importance, espec:ially 
as an element of food/nutritional strateaies and 'food-for-work' schemes. 
69 VI. Tbe Community and progress towards poUtical 
•  umon 
Following the premature demise in the early 1950s of the scheme to establish a European 
1\>litical Community and the failure in 1954 of the proposed European Defence Com-
munity, no further initiative on political union was launched until 1961. At the Bonn 
Summit that year the leaders of the Six instructed a Committee chaired by Christian 
Fouchet, the French Ambassador to Denmark, to submit proposals for a political charter 
for 'the union of their peoples~ In an effort to ftnd a formula that would be acceptable 
to all, the Committee presented two successive drafts - known as the Fouchet Plans. 
But in the course of negotiations a stream of amendments and altematiws w.:re put for-
ward, reflecting the dive!Jent views of the Member States on the nature of such a union 
and the form it should take. The differences between them proved quite intractable and 
eventually on 17 Apri11962, at a meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Paris, it was decided 
to suspend the negotiations.  This meant that for  some  years afterwards  hardly any 
genuine progress was made towards the political goal of 'laying the foundations for an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe'. 
Not until the early 1970s was the impetus renewed. Taking up the call for PIOife&S on 
economic and political union made at the Hague Summit in December 1969, the political 
leaders of the Community at the Paris Summits of 1972 and 1974 pmclaimed as their 
soei the attainment of European union by the end of the decade. Leo Tmdemans, the 
Belaian Prime Minister, was invited by his fellow Heads of GoYmunent to submit a com-
prehensive plan for European union on the basis of  reports presented by the Commission, 
the European Parliament, the Court of Justice and the Economic and Social Committee. 
The Tmdemans •port  envisaged completion of the union by 1980 by means of: 
(i)  the establishment of economic and monetary union; 
(ii) reform of the Community institutions; 
(iii) the implementation of a common policy; 
(iv) the implementation of common reaional and social policies. 
This proved too ambitious a goal to be achieved by the propoaed deadline. In the last 
ana1yais  failure  was  due  to the irreconcilable fundamental  differences  between  the 
Member States on  the constitutional structure and institutional reforms  that wae 
needed. 
Nevertheless, the 1970s brought tangible progress on integration and a number of  new 
Community policy instruments were introduced, widening the scope for the coordina· 
tion of national policies. 
71 In 1970 European political cooperation (EPC) was set up as an instrument for voluntary 
foreign policy coordination and has since been steadily extended and improved. Coopem-
tion between the fureign Ministers and their departments under EPC takes the form of 
regular, fairly frequent meetings and consultations, with additional contacts as and when 
the need arises. The aim is to improve mutual understanding between the Member States 
on all major foreign policy issues and to align and coordinate their positions with a view 
to common action wherever possible, so strengthening solidarity among them. Qriainally 
European political coopemtion opemted largely outside the Community institutional 
fmmework, since the Community's powers are limited under the 'Iieaties to economic 
matters and foreign tiade policy. Like the Community, however, EPC is ultimately intend-
ed to foster European unity; indeed, EPC and the Community are the pillars on which 
that unity must rest. The links ha~  now been strengthened under the Single European 
Act and placed on a formal legal footing, although EPC is still not incorpomted in the 
EEC 'Iieaty. The most notable successes achieved to date are the coordinated approach 
adopted by the Member States at the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe and its follow-up in Madrid, and their common stand on issues taised in the 
United Nations. 
The early 1980s saw the start of a continuing reform debate under mottoes such as 'se-
cond-aenemtion Europe', 'relance europeenne', or 'European union'. The most notable 
of the many initiatives and reform proposals put forward is the draft 'Ii'eaty establishing 
the European union. The brainchild of Altiero Spinelli, it was adopted by a large majority 
'I'M E~  l+ulilutwnt 1IWtJ In Strrubowg. ~.  17-20 July 1979, ,..,  being t/Wct/y tl«:taJfor tht 
jlrst tlmt by tht ptOp/t oftht  EufOJJ«UU Community on 14-17 Junt 1979. 
72 in the European Parliament on  14 February  1984. It is an initiative which marks a 
qualitative leap by Parliament on the road towards European union. 
The proposed 'Ii'eaty provides for the transfer to the union of new powers which reach 
right to the heart of the national domain, covering such areas as economic and monetary 
policy, social policy including welfare and health, and - in foreign policy - security, 
peace and disarmament. Union legislation would be enacted under a bicameral arrange-
ment very similar to a federal system, the aim being to achieve a balance between the 
European Parliament and the Council of the Union (comprising representatives of the 
member governments). This would give the European Parliament joint legislative and 
decision-making powers commensurate with its position as the legitimate democratic 
representative of the people. 
The draft 'Ii'eaty marks the high point so far in the reform discussion surrounding the 
future course of European integration. Although the draft 'Deaty has no chance of being 
ratified by the national parliaments and thus becoming law, it presents a major challenge 
to the Member States, a public test of the seriousness of their commitment to real progress 
towards integration, forcing them to show their true colours. 
It is a challenge which they have taken up. At the Stuttgart European Council of June 
1983, the Heads of State or Government were able to agree only on 'broad action to en-
sure the relaunch of the Community'. At the Fontainebleau and Milan Summits in June 
1984 and 1985 they took up Parliament's initiative and, following their previous declara-
tions of intent, decided on concrete action on two parallel fronts in order to lend a new 
dimension to European integration. 
The fust area of action was institutional reform. An ad hoc Committee on Institutional 
Affairs (the Dooae Committee) was set up under the chairmanship of  the Irish Senator, 
James Dooge. Rather like the Spaak Committee, which had prepared the basic texts for 
the negotiations on the establishment of the EEC and Euratom, it was composed of  per-
sonal representatives of the Heads of State or Government. The Committee's mandate 
was to make suggestions to improve European cooperation in both the Community field 
and European political cooperation and to consider possible areas for progress towards 
European union. 
The second line of approach was to work towards a 'people's Europe' which will pay 
greater heed to the concerns and interests of the ordinary citizen. Again the task of draw-
ing up concrete proposals was entrusted to an ad hoc committee, which started work on 
7 November 1984 under the chairmanship of Pietro Adonnino. Its conclusions are dealt 
with in the fmal section of this booklet. 
The IlooiC Committee offered the most likely prospect of immediate progress on political 
integration. The Committee's fmal report, which serwd as a basis for discussion by the 
Heads of State or Government at their meeting in Milan in June 1985, pointed the way 
73 towaJds European union throuah the creation of an coonomic area without internal fron-
tiers,  the strenathenina of European political cooperation by includilll security and 
defence, and the impt'O\'ement of decision-makina by cxtendina the rights of Parliament. 
After a rather strained discussion of these and a number of other proposals submitted 
by wrious Member States and the Commission, the Milan European Council decided 
toconwne an Interaovemmental Conference to negotiate a treaty on foreian and security 
policy and to work out amendments to  the EEC 'Deaty before the next European Council 
meeting in luxemboWJ on 2 December 1985. 
The Confcrcncc, conducted in an atmosphere of feverish activity and often rather heated 
discussion,  fOCUIIed  principally  on  extending  the  common  market,  incorporatilll 
monetary cooperation into the EEC 'Ireaty and strclllthcning the J)CJWiel'l of Parliament. 
The negotiations demonstrate wry clearly how difficult it still is to reconcile national in-
terests with the demands of European integration. 
All the Member States agreed in principle on the Commission's proposal for completion 
of the European internal market by 1992-but only if  what they regarded as their essen-
tial interests were safeguarded. In concrete terms this meant that none of them was 
prepared to  sacrifice sovereignty in the key area of taxation by aareeina to majority voting 
in the Council on measures to harmonize tax systems (measures which are vital for the 
establishment of the internal market); any ctumaes to tax systems were to be decided, as 
in the past, by unanimous vote. On the question of approximatina national legislation 
to liberalize trade, Britain and Ireland entered reservations about majority votinJ on the 
harmonization of  animal and plant health regulations, claiming that their existiq health 
controls were needed to keep infections such as rabies and foot-and-mouth disea&e out 
of  the islands. Denmark and Germany saw harmonization by majority voting as a threat 
to their strict rules on environmental protection, safety at work and food hyaiene and 
quality, since it would inevitably lead to a drop in standards. 
The incorporation of  the EMS into the EEC 'Ireaty - viaoroualY advocated by Jacques 
De1ors, the current President of the Commission - was supported only by the French, 
BeJajan and Italian deleptioos. The Federal Republic of Germany, the United KiDidom 
and the Netherlands were unhappy about the idea of allowing the Community institu-
tions any say in the further ~lopment  of economic and monetary cooperation. The 
German Gomnment in particular was concerned that such a mOYe miaht affect the 
stability of the mark and restrict the independence of the Bundecbank, 
Nearly aU the IQWirllJMllts aareed that Parliament's role in the Community should be 
enhanced. But apin  none of them-except Italy-eyer envisa&ed grantina it real deci-
sion-makina powers.  The Danish Parliament, the FolbtinJ, had emt forbidden  the 
Gowrnment to qree  to any such  amendmenta to the 'Ii'eaties. The UK  Oovemment in-
timated that it could not qree to aoythina that \WUid pant the European Parliament 
powers which the national parliamont did not enjoy. 
74 Uniting western Europe 
In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify western Europe? Are 
you very much for, to eome extent for, to some extent against or very much against? 
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15 This brief look behind the scenes clearly shows that none of the Member States is yet 
willin& or able to take the bold step of sacrifiCing a substantial portion of its national 
sowreiJnty and settina out on the road to European union so clearly marked out in 
Parliament's draft 'Deaty. It was hardly to be expected, then, that the I.wrembouq Euro-
pean Council of 2 December 1985 would mark the birth of the European union. 
Nevertheless, the decisions taken at LuxemboUJ'I provide a sound platform for closer 
cooperation in the important areas of  the internal market, the environment, re&ea~eh  and 
technoioiY and foreian policy. The most significant feature is that the concrete steps en-
visapd were not set out in a final communiq\16, as is normally the case after a summit, 
but were incorporated in the lep1 framework of a 'Single European  Act~ 
The Preamble to the Single Act reiterates the broad objective - creation of a European 
union - which the Community and European political cooperation are meant to help 
achieve. The Act then lays down the detailed lepl  framework needed for practical pro-
. gress in the areas qreed, with provisions covering the Community institutions, the inter-
nal  market,  economic  and  monetary  cooperation,  social  policy,  research  and 
technolo&ical development, and the environment (these have been dealt with in the rele-
wnt  chapters). The provisions of  the Act take the form of  amendments and additions to 
the existing 'Deaties.  The third part of the Act deaJs  with European foreian  policy 
cooperation, setting out a lepl framework for European political cooperation. 
With its entry into force on 1  July 1987, the Sinlle European Act became part of  the legal 
bedrock on wbicb the Community rests and on which European union is to be built. The 
task now is to mab  full use of  the new opportunities which it opens up in order to further 
the cause of intepation for the aood of everyone in the Community. 
Taking stock of  PfOII'el8 so far towardl completing the siJII}e market, the re~ulta  are quite 
impressive. By the end of 1988, 228 proposals (out of the 279 measures envisqed in the 
c_ommiaion's White Paper on c:ompletina the internal market) had  been praented  to the 
Council for a decilion, of  which 128 bad already been adopted. Moreover the8e are not 
merely decision~  on side issues but on matters which lie at the heart of  the whole wnture 
- notably the mutual recopition of depas and diplomas and the liberalization of 
capital IDOYemeD.ts, intra-Community JQOds traffiC. and substantial areas of  public pro-
cumnent. E'Vell thouib Be¥eral fundamental deciaiona still remain to be tabn-for ex-
ample on the harmonization of  indilect taxes and on economic and IOCial matters - it 
is none the lela clear that the proceu is eU  under way. The task now fac:iDa the '~\¥me 
is to cbannel this enqy into steady, continued PfOII'eii&O that the areat expectations 
awatened by the prospect of the sinale market are actually fulfilled in practice. 
At this point, ~  it il  perhaps fitting to recall the phrase used by Jacqua Delors 
to describe the Sinale European N:t: be called it a 'compromise for PfOII'JIII' , liviD& us 
a sober reminder that Rome wu  not built in a day. It wiD take patience and the penonal 
commitment of aoery individual to mercome the centuries of national di'YqellCe and 
brina about eYer clo&er union amona the countries and peoplea of Europe. 
16 Epilogue: The Community and its citizens 
Whether the process of European integration and the proaress allady achiewd can be 
effectively continued to full fruition depends on their beiDa accepted by the people of 
Europe and sustained by a sense of European identity. The sheer complexity of deciaions 
at Community level and the intricacies of the Community's workinp make it bani for 
people to grasp the full implications and tend to hamper the emeqence of  the necessary 
sense of solidarity and common interests. European intearation must remain credible. 
That this is something to which people are wry sensitive is clearly reflected in opinion 
poll fmdinp and in the poor turnout for the June 1989 elections to the European Parlia-
ment. It showed that people are not prepared to accept the inconsistency between swee~ 
ina declarations and statements of intent and the failure to give substance to them in 
many areas of daily life. As noted earlier this is especially true as repJds qricultural 
surpluses and frontier checks on persons, goods and currency. 
Th counteract this discontent a series of  measures are to be taken that will haw a taqible 
effect on  people's daily  lives.  In 1985  the ad hoc Committee on  a people's  Europe 
presented two reports proposing a packqe of meaaures subsequently endorsed by the 
European Council, some of which the Commission has already submitted to the Council 
of Ministers for a decision. The proposals cover a broad spectrum including the abolition 
of systematic checks at internal Community frontiers, wider opportunities for Communi-
ty citizens to work and live in other Member States, closer cooperation in the fields of 
culture, youth policy, education, sport and health, and the introduction of symbols to 
strcnphen the Community's image and identity. 
One of the most urgent tasks is to bring about genuine simplifications in the checks on 
Community citizens at internal borders, where the continued existence of physical bar-
riers, 'customs' sian& and often lengthy waiting times arc both symbolic and very visible 
evidence of the practical shortcomings of European integration. A welcome first step in 
this direction is the Council's decision of November 1986 to abolish customs silOS at in-
ternal frontiers between the 'IWelw from 1 January 1988. They will be replaced by silOS 
showing the Community symbol (a circle of 12 yellow stars on a blue bacqround) and 
the name of  the Member State. A European passport has also been~  by the 1Welve 
and already introduced by most of them-except the United KiJl&dom, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Portupl. Besides these measures the main outstandina tasks arc to raise the 
allowances for personal items (at present ECU 350 per person) and postal consignments, 
to  prevent double  taxation,  to  reduce  the formalities  for  domestic  removals  and to 
simplify currency controls. 
Providing wider employment opportunities requires, among other things, a decision on 
the long-standing unresolved issue of recognition of hisher education diplomas. 'Daining 
standards arc high in all the Community countries so that it should be possible to obtain 
qualifiCations in any Member State - indeed, it would be absurd to argue that a person 
77 loses his or her skills and knowledge when crossing a border. There should also be a deci-
sion of principle on a general right of residence in any Member State for all citizens of 
the Community. Beyond this the Commission has proposed giving Community nationals 
the right to vote in local elections wherever their main centre of interest lies. The oppor-
tunity which this offers for people to play an actiw part in the process of framing political 
objectives is a crucial factor for promoting integration and developing and strengthening 
a sense of  common interests. The proposal has already been endorsed by the vast majority 
of MEPs and now needs only to be adopted by the Council. 
In the field of cultural cooperation, consideration is being given to the establishment of 
a Community-wide 'audiovisual area'. Not only are Community citizens to have max-
imum access to other Member States' national broadcasts but they will also be able in 
the future to tune in to a truly European multilingual channel. Ewry year a European 
'city of culture' is designated and 1988 was declared 'European cinema and television 
year: 
A crucial aspect is the strengthening of European youth work and education, with the 
major task of fostering understanding between the peoples of the Community. Besides 
improving language teaching, this involves giving attention to the European dimension 
in the classroom and promoting both general and vocational youth exchanges (YES pro-
gramme), student mobility and cooperation between uniwrsities (Erasmus programme). 
Progress on the health and social security front is to be secured by facilitating access to 
medical attention for travellers anywhere within the Community. Commission proposals 
in this area have already been put before the Council, including one for the issue of health 
cards and another aimed at ensuring continuity of treatment for dialysis patients. Living 
conditions for the handicapped and the socially deprived are to be substantially imprtMd 
and medical research and technology, especially in the field of cancer, is to be intensified. 
Attention is also to be given to combating drug abuse, the aim being to cooperate with 
existing bodies on the prevention and treatment of addiction and the social reintegration 
of addicts. 
Finally, symbolic action to strengthen the Community's image and identity includes the 
recent introduction of a Community flag, emblem and anthem. Let us hope that these 
measures will bring a people's Europe a good deal closer, transforming the European 
Community into a tanaible reality in the daily lives of its citizens, and making people 
aware of the value of working for a united Europe. 
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This booklet deacribea the oriains, aima, sua:esses, and failures of the European -venture that has now 
been under way for more than 35 years. EN 
For more than 35 years the effort to fuse together first 
six, then nine, later 10, and now 12 European coun-
tries in a united Europe has steadUy continued. look-
ing back on it, the optimists claim that the endeavour 
has  been more successful than the authors of the 
Community Treaties in the early 1950s could have 
daied ·to hope.  Others,  however, are critical of the 
Member States for  having frittered away a historic 
opportunity or at least slowed down progress. 
This booklet describes the origins, aims, successes, 
and failures of the European venture. It is suitable for 
any one interested in the subject, but has been writ-
ten especially with young people in mind. For with 
the courage of youth,  the challenge of integration 
can  be  met  and  their right  to a European  future 
secured. 
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